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ABSTRACT 
Genetically modified (GM) food crops have the potential to raise agricultural productivity in Asian 
countries, but they are also associated with the risk of market access losses in sensitive importing 
countries. We study the potential effects of introducing GM food crops in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines in the presence of trade-related regulations of GM food in major importers. We focus 
on GM field crops (rice, wheat, maize, soybeans, and cotton) resistant to biotic and abiotic stresses, such 
as drought-resistant rice, and use a multi-country, multi-sector computable general equilibrium model. 
We build on previous international simulation models by improving the representation of the productivity 
shocks associated with GM crops, and by using an improved representation of the world market, 
accounting for the effects of GM food labeling policies in major importers and the possibility of 
segregation for non-GM products going toward sensitive importing countries. 
The results of our simulations first show that the gains associated with the adoption of GM food 
crops largely exceed any type of potential trade losses these countries may incur. Adopting GM crops also 
allows net importing countries to greatly reduce their imports. Overall, we find that GM rice is bound to 
be the most advantageous crop for the four countries. Second, we find that segregation of non-GM crops 
can help reduce any potential trade loss for GM adopters, such as India, that want to keep export 
opportunities in sensitive countries, even with a 5 percent segregation cost. Lastly, we find that the 
opportunity cost of segregation is much larger for sensitive importing countries than for countries 
adopting new GM crops, which suggests that sensitive importers will have the incentive to invest in 
separate non-GM marketing channels if exporting countries like India decide to adopt GM food crops.  
Keywords: genetically modified food, international trade, segregation, Asia   1
1.  INTRODUCTION  
In the last 11 years, the global production of genetically modified (GM) crops has increased dramatically. 
Yet more than 95 percent of the area devoted to GM crops is located in only four countries: the United 
States, Argentina, Canada, and China (James 2006). During the same period, a group of countries with 
consumer opposition to GM food, led by the European Union (EU) and Japan, have implemented 
stringent policies regulating the approval and import of GM crops and the marketing of GM food. In the 
context of increased international agricultural trade, the regulations of those importers and the lack of 
demand for GM food in those countries have likely limited the expansion of agricultural biotechnology to 
many developing countries. 
For several years, a number of Asian countries have been actively developing programs of 
research on agricultural biotechnology, focusing on GM crops with potentially beneficial agronomic traits 
(Runge and Ryan 2004). Some of these countries have developed biosafety regulatory frameworks, but 
until now only a few have approved one or more GM crops. Recent studies have shown that the 
introduction of Bt cotton (GM cotton resistant to insects) in India and China has generated revenue gains 
for farmers overall (e.g., Pray et al. 2002; Bennett et al. 2004). But those two countries approved only the 
large-scale production of GM cotton, in part because unlike other GM crops, the main products of cotton 
are not used for food and thus are not subject to food safety approval, traceability, and labeling 
regulations or GM-free private standards in major importing countries. In particular, neither Japan nor the 
EU directly regulates textile products derived from GM cotton.  
In fact, the fear of export loss is a major driver in the reluctance to use GM technology in 
developing countries (Paarlberg 2002; Gruere 2006). That fear may be driven by large traders in 
exporting countries afraid to lose market access. Following a detection of unapproved U.S. GM rice in 
EU and Japanese markets, prompting rapid import bans, Thailand and Vietnam, two of the largest rice 
exporters, announced that they would remain GM-free and would not approve any GM rice. Rice 
exporters in India have argued against field-testing of GM rice for similar reasons. But the fear is also 
patent in countries importing current or potential GM crops. In many cases such fears are largely 
exaggerated and based on misinformation or a poor knowledge of the global trade system by 
biotechnology governing bodies. Paarlberg (2006) shows that African countries have virtually no export 
to lose from adopting current GM crops. Smythe, Kerr, and Davey (2006) show that despite claims by 
GM crop opponents, major exporters that adopted GM crops in the 1990s have experienced no loss in 
export value or volume; rather, their exports have been diverted to other markets. Several ex ante 
simulation models have also shown that China or Sub-Saharan Africa are bound to gain largely from 
adopting GM food or feed crops even with bans in large importing nations (Huang et al. 2004; Anderson   2
and Jackson 2005). Lastly, the fear is also based on the mistaken idea that segregating GM and non-GM 
crops is infeasible or prohibitively costly. In fact, virtually all large GM-food- or feed-producing countries 
(the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa) produce alternative non-GM crops, and even 
organic crops for domestic and/or international markets.  
In this context, many Asian countries that have invested in research and regulations on GM food 
crops are confronted with what they see as three possible alternatives: (1) allow the production of GM 
food crops with the risk of losing potential exports; (2) reject the commercialization of any GM food 
crop; or (3) produce both GM and non-GM crops separately at a marketing cost.  
The purpose of this paper is to provide an integrated economic assessment of these three 
strategies focusing on India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines—four countries that the 
agricultural biotechnology and trade literature has largely ignored. More specifically, the paper has two 
main objectives. First, the study assesses the impacts of large importers’ regulations (such as the EU and 
Japan) on the potential benefits of adopting particular GM crops in the four countries. Second, we 
evaluate the opportunity cost of GM/non-GM segregation for such crops under the external constraints 
previously defined. We focus on four major traded commodities—rice, wheat, maize, and soybeans—but 
we also include cotton and its derived cottonseed. For each crop, we select a set of biotic or abiotic stress 
resistance traits (such as insect resistance or drought resistance) according to the status of research, and 
the productivity and income potential they promise in these four countries.  
We build on previous literature using computable general equilibrium models by improving the 
representation of trade policies and refining the assumptions on the productivity effects of biotechnology. 
First, we account for the “trade filter” effect of GM food marketing policies in GM-food-sensitive 
countries, which allow the importation of products for intermediate consumption (as exceptions to the 
labeling policies) but not products for final consumption. Second, we include the option of costly 
segregation of non-GM crops for export, and we model GM crop adoption as a factor-biased productivity 
shock based on disaggregated data on agricultural constraints. These assumptions help us to obtain robust 
estimates of the economic effects of adopting GM crops in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines under current trade regulations, and they allow us to derive the opportunity cost of segregation 
of GM and non-GM crops.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the literature on global 
trade modeling of GM food introduction. Then, we describe the methodology employed to derive 
productivity shifts with the adoption of particular GM crops in the four countries. In the fourth section we 
explain the specificities of our trade model and present our scenarios. The results of the simulations are 
presented in section 5 and discussed in section 6. We close the paper with a few policy conclusions.    3
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Since 2000, many papers have used multi-country computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to 
simulate the introduction of GM crops under various international scenarios. In their review of the applied 
economic literature on GM crops in developing countries, Smale et al. (2006) found 14 articles following 
this approach and focusing on developing countries. Each paper uses a modified version of a CGE model 
based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database (Hertel 1997) that includes vertical and 
horizontal linkages in the economy to examine the effects of GM technology adoption on multiple sectors 
and regions. The papers and approaches differ in their assumptions about the productivity effects of the 
technology, in their assumptions about the rate of adoption, and according to the scenarios they depict 
concerning trade policies, consumer perceptions, and market assumptions. In this section, we do not 
provide a complete review of the literature; instead we concentrate our attention on some of the relevant 
CGE studies on GM crop adoption in developing nations, particularly those that focus on Asian countries.  
First, at a global scale, Nielsen, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2001) studied the introduction of GM 
oilseeds and grains in seven regions. They modeled the technology with a 10 percent Hicks-neutral 
productivity shift of primary factors, with costless segregation of GM and non-GM food in all countries 
and consumer price sensitivity differences. They find that the total welfare (as measured in terms of 
absorption) would increase by $12 billion with the adoption of GM maize and oilseeds in selected 
countries, but it could be reduced by $1 billion if consumers had a preference for non-GM food. Nielsen 
and Anderson (2001) later used a 5 percent productivity shift with the adoption of GM grains and oilseeds 
and ran three scenarios: first, the adoption of GM crops with no trade constraints; second, a ban of GM 
crops in western Europe; and third, a shift in consumer preference away from GM crops in western 
Europe. They obtain a lower range of global welfare effects with $9.9 billion in the first scenario, $3.4 
billion in the second with a trade ban, and $8.5 billion in the case of the preference shift. Although most 
of the relative welfare loss with trade restriction or demand change is attributed to Europe, these two 
studies demonstrate the importance of European policies on potential gains from GM crop technology.  
Several papers focus on China. Anderson and Yao (2003) simulated the introduction of GM rice, 
cotton, maize, and oilseeds in a number of countries with or without China, using a 5 percent Hicks-
neutral productivity shift. They also include a scenario that eliminates the Chinese voluntary export 
restraint on textile. The results show that China would largely benefit from introducing GM rice before 
any other crop, and that a voluntary export restraint removal would multiply by 20 the benefits from Bt 
cotton. Huang et al. (2004) analyzed the effects of GM cotton and GM rice introduction in China, based 
on regional farm-level survey data, adding labeling costs, loss of demand in export markets, and dynamic 
adoption, but without adoption of these crops in other countries. Their results show that China can   4
continue to benefit from an extended adoption of Bt cotton, but that it would benefit even more from the 
introduction of GM rice, whose formal approval decision has been postponed by regulatory authorities in 
the last few years.  
Other studies focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Anderson and Jackson (2005) use a factor-biased 
productivity shift to look at the effect of GM coarse grains, oilseeds, wheat, and rice in Sub-Saharan 
Africa with and without trade restrictions. They show that Sub-Saharan Africa would gain as much with 
or without a GM ban in the EU, but that imposing a moratorium on GM imports and production in the EU 
would result in significant losses worldwide. Anderson, Valenzuela, and Jackson (2006) evaluate the 
effect of Bt cotton introduction in Sub-Saharan Africa with and without World Trade Organization trade 
reform and show that the effects of GM cotton adoption could exceed those of a trade reform for Sub-
Saharan African countries.  
Lastly, a few studies focus on the effect of GM rice introduction in multiple countries. Anderson, 
Jackson, and Nielsen (2004) provide an analysis of GM rice and golden rice (nutritionally enhanced) 
adoption in multiple countries, using factor-biased productivity shifts and running various trade scenarios. 
They show that golden rice could provide a much bigger boost to countries adopting it due to its assumed 
effect on overall labor productivity in all sectors. Focusing on productivity-enhancing traits, Hareau et al. 
(2005) evaluate the effects of three different GM rice events (Bt, herbicide tolerant, and drought tolerant) 
with factor-biased productivity shifts, accounting for intranational differences in land type, providing a 
convincing approach to productivity modeling. Their results show that if the benefits of the three 
technologies are similar overall, the distribution of benefits highly depend on the particular trait.  
Table 1. Ranges of welfare effects ($ million/yr) experienced by India, China, and the world overall 
obtained by selected CGE studies of the introduction of GM crops 
India  Crop 





adoption of GM 
crops 
World 
Maize and soybeans  0 to 3  1265 to 1277  804 to 839  -1287 to 9859 
Cotton  -26 to -41  710 to 822  314 to 563  856 to 2610 
Rice  -18 to -23  458 to 709  190 to 4155  -5452 to 4887 
Golden rice  n.a.  2528  7209  17438 
Maize, soybeans, 
rice and wheat 
n.a.  654 to 669  832 to 841  -946 to 7506 
Sources: Ranges of estimates obtained from a combination of Anderson and Yao (2003); Anderson and Jackson (2005); 
Anderson, Jackson, and Nielsen (2004); Anderson, Valenzuela, and Jackson (2006); Hareau et al. (2005); Elbehri and 
MacDonald (2004); Huang et al. (2004); and Nielsen and Anderson (2001). 
Table 1 provides ranges of estimates of the welfare effects India, China, and the world overall 
would see under the adoption of GM crops, drawn from previous literature under various scenarios. The 
large variance in results is naturally due to the diversity of scenarios and assumptions, in particular 
regarding productivity shifts and international trade. Still, a few general lessons can be drawn from   5
observing these results. First, India seems to be better off adopting GM crops than rejecting them when 
other countries adopt them. Second, apart from the specific study on golden rice, it is difficult to draw 
general lessons about the relative advantage of different GM crops. Third, the world can lose with GM 
food or feed crop adoption under certain scenarios.  
In their review of the literature focusing on research methodologies, Smale et al. (2006) note that 
CGE studies of GM crop introduction have progressively improved over time with a better representation 
of productivity shifts, from Hicks-neutral productivity shifts based on relatively general assumptions to 
factor-biased productivity shifts based on specific trait and regional differences (e.g., Elbehri and 
McDonald 2004; Hareau et al. 2005; Huang et al. 2004), and more complex trade policy representation 
(e.g., van Meijl and van Tongeren 2004; Anderson et al. 2006). Overall the improvement of the 
assumptions on productivity shifts has translated into a relative diminution of the results in terms of 
global welfare effects for current GM crops.  
In this paper, we build on previous analysis by proposing an incremental improvement in three 
regards. First, as explained in the next section, we provide regionally based productivity in the countries 
we focus on. Second, as explained in section 4, we provide a more complex representation of the 
international market regulations. Third, we combine our analysis for our countries of study with 
assumptions on other countries reflecting the observed effects derived in published papers.  
At the same time, we focus on four countries—India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines—that have largely been excluded from previous reports. Only Hareau et al. (2006) studied the 
effects of GM rice in these and other Asian countries, taking into account land type and technology 
differences but excluding trade restrictions. Most other studies only aggregated developing nations of 
Asia into China, India, and the rest of Asia. We aim to provide additional insights into the possible effects 
of GM food in these four populous countries of Asia.   6
3. PRODUCTIVITY MODELING  
Predicting the effect of a future technology is not trivial; it necessarily relies on a careful analysis of 
available information based on the current situation, and on the determination of plausible scenarios. In 
the setting of global trade modeling, one single parameter standing for a productivity shift of a country or 
region will represent a complex agro-economic process that implicitly should derive from the local 
agronomic constraints, the local agronomic practices, the local likelihood of adoption of the new 
technology (based on its availability, price, input markets, and extension systems), and the local 
adaptation of the new technology.  
In this paper, we attempt to take one step forward in this direction by modeling GM technology 
introduction with factor-biased productivity shifts (including yield, chemical use, and labor effects) using 
spatially disaggregated estimates of technology potential and adoption rates combined into national 
aggregate effects of technology in India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines. We also use expert 
data to formulate scenarios of adoptions accounting for plausible differences across types of land. This 
overall process is intended to help reduce uncertainties and replace what may appear as arbitrary 
productivity shifts by more consistent and plausible ones. In this section, we explain the successive steps 
of the method used to derive our assumed productivity shifts in the four countries of study. 
A) Collection of Expert and Secondary Data on Constraints and Technology Potential 
We conducted a series of consultations and focus group meetings with scientific, agricultural, and 
regulatory experts in India and Bangladesh in July 2005 and Indonesia and the Philippines in September 
2005 on the potential effects of biotechnology improvements to resist biotic and abiotic stresses. In total, 
10 meetings were held in five cities in India (Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Calcutta), two 
meetings in two locations in Bangladesh (Dhaka and Mymensingh), four meetings in Indonesia (in Bogor, 
Java), and four meetings in the Philippines (in Luzon). In each such meeting we discussed the status of 
research, agricultural constraints for major crops of interest, the potential of biotechnology to address 
those constraints, and other issues related to regulatory approval and consumer acceptance of transgenic 
crops.1 We also asked the participants at these meetings to fill out questionnaires in order to elicit 
subjective estimates of potential yield and input effects of future new technologies (as done for rice in 
Evenson, Herdt, and Hossain 1996). In parallel, we obtained existing national and international studies of 
GM technology, productivity constraints, and technology potential publicly available for these and other 
countries.  
                                                      
1 We do not provide an analysis of the outcomes of the meetings in this paper, but we plan to provide more explanations in a 
longer report. The results of the consultations conducted in Bangladesh are summarized in Gruere et al. (2006).    7
B) Obtaining the Range of Potential Technology Yield Effects in Affected Areas2 
The discussions in our meetings helped us decide to focus on four types of traits—insect resistance, 
virus/disease resistance, drought resistance, and salt tolerance applied specifically to rice, wheat, maize, 
and soybeans in each country. Each GM crop/trait combination is modeled based on its effect on yields 
and use of chemical inputs (mainly pesticides) and its assumed effect on labor. We would have liked to 
include the cost of seeds as a third factor, but we later realized that we did not have the proper data to 
incorporate it into the global model. Yet we can justify the exclusion of seed premiums by using 
exogenous partial adoption rates. As a consequence our results will be inclusive of the benefits of 
developers and not only producers.  
In this subsection we describe more specifically the case of yield effects, for which we use 
triangular distribution of estimates, but our derivations of the input effects also follow the same general 
procedure. Combining expert estimates on constraints and productivity potential and secondary data on 
yield constraints, we derived expected yield effects in rainfed versus irrigated land in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines and in each water basin region of India. Triangular distributions of yield 
constraints (or yield gap) and of the potential effects of using transgenic crops from the questionnaires 
and meetings are aggregated by taking the “minmin” and “maxmax” values and by averaging the most 
likely values (excluding clear outliers). We compute average ranges of potential effects by averaging over 
the most likely values of yield constraints (or yield gap) from different data sources, with the minimum 
and maximum values retained. The ratio of expected yield effects on yield constraints derived from 
experts’ data is used as a proxy for the expected efficacy of the technology. This efficacy rate is 
multiplied by the yield gap associated with the constraint to obtain the range of most likely yield effects 
of the technology.  
C) Affected Land and Production Type by Water Basin Projection 
The resulting yield effect is multiplied by the production share for each subregion represented by a 
particular type of land (and water basin in India) in order to obtain a weighted average of the total yield 
effects for each country. To do so, we used 2015 projections of irrigated and rainfed areas by water basins 
in India and in each of the other three countries from a baseline simulation of the IMPACT-Water model 
developed at IFPRI. IMPACT-Water is a multi-market partial equilibrium model of agricultural 
production and trade at the water basin level that projects the evolution of land and agriculture. The 
combination of yield effect by subregion and share of each subregion in each country generates national 
average yield effects of each technology assuming a 100 percent adoption rate. 
                                                      
2 In this section, we focus on our derivations of the yield effects. The derivations of the input effects were mostly based on a 
combination of primary and secondary data per crop/trait combination, but did not involve range calculations.    8
For the case of crops resistant to abiotic stresses—i.e., drought- and salt-tolerant crops—we also 
estimated the share of affected areas in each subregion in order to account for the fact that not all land is 
affected by drought or soil salinity constraints. To do so, we used categorical indicators of drought and 
salinity constraints by areas of production, type of land, and water basin based on a satellite imagery and 
agricultural study developed by the spatial team of IFPRI.3 The measure of drought is based on the 
annual variation (around a three-decade average) of the length of growing period computed for each of 
the 30 years from 1961 through 1990 (Fischer et al. 2002). The soil salinity index is based on a Fertility 
Capability Classification approach (Smith et al. 1998; Sánchez, Couto, and Buol 1982) applied to the 
mapping units of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Soil Map of the World. (FAO 1995). The 
results allowed dividing the land into 10 types of categories of risk based on the share of saline land in 
each spatial unit.  
By filtering these indicators with production area in each spatial unit, we obtained the share of 
affected areas in each subregion. We then built categorical yield responses to the risk of drought or 
salinity. For instance, in the case of drought, the IFPRI spatial team was able to classify delimited areas of 
land in four categories: no risk, low risk, medium risk, and high risk. We attributed probability of risk for 
each category (using a linear approximation) to obtain expected damage or expected yield potential due to 
drought in a particular subregion. The output is a weighted average of damage in each subregion 
representing the national effect of abiotic-stress-resistant crops with a 100 percent adoption rate among 
producers affected.  
D) Adoption: Expert Data and Secondary Data on High-Yield Varieties Adoption  
There are two ways to model adoption: it can be done endogenously or exogenously. To our knowledge, 
all previous simulation models used exogenous adoption rates. In this study, we also use exogenous rates, 
but we vary the initial adoption rates according to the type of land and subregion. In particular, we assume 
that producers in rainfed areas will not have the same adoption rate as producers in irrigated areas. 
Generally speaking, producers in irrigated areas tend to have better access to new technologies, but at the 
same time, rainfed producers may benefit more from certain technologies.  
In addition, regional differences matter, and in a country like India certain states tend to be the 
first to provide and adopt new technologies and have a higher proportion of technology adopters. To 
account for that fact, we correct the production share of each Indian region by a proportional factor linked 
to historical data on the adoption of high-yielding varieties of each crop obtained from IndiaStat. Instead 
of assuming that a GM crop will be adopted in all regions the same way, we let certain regions be 
                                                      
3 The detailed mapping methodology, using an entropy approach to spatial disaggregation, is explained in detail in You and 
Wood (2006). Abiotic stress indicators were developed by Liang You, Stan Wood, and Cynthia Rossi, following a methodology 
explained in detail in IFPRI (2005) for India and Bangladesh.   9
relatively larger adopters of the crop. The adoption rate in each subregion is then multiplied by each yield 
and area factor to obtain a total expected yield effect of the technology in 2010, 2015, and 2020. 
E) Obtaining Land Type Aggregate Effect and National Effects 
The aggregate national effect of the technology is computed with the following formula: 
. lt w lw lw lw
lw
y α βσ λ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑  where l stands for type of land (irrigated or rainfed), w for the water basin, and t 
for time; α is the exogenous adoption rate per type of land (for abiotic stress it represents the adoption 
among producers affected) and period; β is the proportional spatial correction of adoption rate based on 
observed rates of adoption of high-yielding varieties in each water basin; σ is the share of production of 
the crop in the subregion; y is the yield effect in each subregion; and λ is the share of production under 
rainfed or irrigated conditions affected by a specific abiotic stress. Ten water basins are used to represent 
India, while the three other countries are represented by one unit each, and therefore only disaggregated 
according to the type of land and time.  
F) Assumptions for the Major Technologies in the Countries of Interest 
Table 2. Absolute productivity effects and initial adoption assumed for Bangladesh  
Bangladesh  % Yield effects  % Input effects  % Initial adoption 
Technology Min  ML  Max  Chemicals  Labor  IR  RF Total 
DR rice  0.13  1.13  4.89  0  0  7.8  34.4  9.76 
ST rice  0.39  0.57  0.81  0  0  2.96  1.9  2.88 
Bt  rice  0.39  0.82  1.17  -14.62  -2.56  40 20 36.56 
DR wheat  0.25  0.83  1.52  0  0  8  27.4  14.75 
Bt maize  0  1.38  2.50  -10  -1.88  0  25  25 
DR  maize 0 1.75  5.25  0  0  0 7 7 
VR maize  0  2.25  5.25  -6  -1.13  0  15  15 
Source: Authors. 
Notes: ML = most likely, DR = drought resistant, ST = salt tolerant, VR = virus or disease resistant, IR = irrigated land, RF = 
rainfed land.   10
Table 3. Absolute productivity effects and initial adoption assumed for India 
India  % Yield effects  % Input effects  % Initial adoption 
Technology Min  ML  Max  Chemicals  Labor  IR  RF  Total 
DR rice  0.30  2.58  6.69  0  0  24.55  18.4  22.43 
ST rice  0.37  1.97  3.76  0  0  9.95  4.06  7.91 
Bt rice  0.30  1.03  2.13  -9.5  -2.31  60  10  27.6 
VR rice  0.11  0.43  0.87  -0.97  -0.4  30  5  13.8 
DR wheat  0.16  1.83  2.94  0  0  1.55  8.20  5.86 
ST wheat  0.15  0.67  1.13  0  0  6.3  2.51  3.84 
VR wheat  0.44  3.51  8.50  -1.47  -1.10  25  5  14.73 
Bt maize  1.61  3.29  5.76  -1.46  -1.02  25  5  14.57 
DR maize  0.34  2.20  3.06  0  0  1.79  15.42  8.92 
VR maize  0.37  1.30  2.59  -0.37  -0.18  10  5  7.39 
VR soybeans  0  0.83  4.58  -0.97  -0.68  15  8  9.66 
Source: Authors. 
Notes: ML = most likely, DR = drought resistant, ST = salt tolerant, VR = virus or disease resistant, IR = irrigated land, RF = 
rainfed land. 
Table 4. Absolute productivity effects and initial adoption assumed for Indonesia 
Indonesia  % Yield effects  % Input effects  % Initial adoption 
Technology Min  ML  Max  Chemicals  Labor  IR  RF  Total 
DR rice  0  0.46  1.27  0  0  4.5  36.4  7.75 
Bt rice  0.49  1.23  2.46  -7.57  -4.34  50  20  43.38 
VR rice  0.01  0.51  1.17  -1.70  -1.28  15  5  12.79 
Bt maize  0.15  0.35  0.79  -3.00  -1.50  15  15  15 
DR  maize  0.10 2.15 4.24  0  0  2.3 34.1  28.06 
VR maize  0.03  0.06  0.12  0  -0.06  5  2  2.38 
IR soybeans  3  8.25  18  -13.5  -1.25  0  30  30 
DR soybeans  0.09  1.89  3.73  0  0  0  23  23.15 
VR soybeans  0.6  5.48  18.0  -18  -3.00  0  30  30 
Source: Authors. 
Notes: ML = most likely, DR = drought resistant, IR = insect resistant, VR = virus or disease resistant, IR = irrigated land, RF = 
rainfed land. 
Table 5. Absolute productivity effects and initial adoption assumed for the Philippines 
Philippines  % Yield effects  % Input effects  % Initial adoption 
Technology Min  ML  Max  Chemicals  Labor  IR  RF  Total 
DR rice  0.08  1.36  3.72  0  0  3.8  33.6  13.11 
Bt rice  0  0.68  1.01  -20.50  -3.20  40  15  32.02 
VR rice  0  0.61  1.23  -10.01  -1.52  20  5  15.21 
Source: Authors. 
Notes: ML = most likely, DR = drought resistant, VR = virus or disease resistant, IR = irrigated land, RF = rainfed land. 
The assumptions derived from this process for the four countries of study are presented in 
absolute terms at the national level in tables 2, 3, 4, and 5. The tables present the assumed effects of each 
technology projected in 2015, as these are the ones used as reference for the simulation model.4 The 
parameters presented in the tables include minimum, most likely, and maximum value of the total yield 
effect, the total chemical effects, and the total labor effects at the national level under the initial adoption 
                                                      
4 We also derived the effects and adoption for each crop in 2010 and 2020, but we did not use them in the simulations 
presented in this paper. We may decide to use them later within a dynamic modeling approach.    11
rate presented in the last three columns.5 For instance, the introduction of Bt maize (insect resistant) in 
Bangladesh (fifth row of Table 2) at an adoption rate of 25 percent only in rainfed areas would result in a 
most likely 1.38 percent yield increase, a 10 percent reduction of chemicals, and a 1.88 percent labor 
reduction in maize at the national level. The introduction of drought-resistant rice in India (first row of 
Table 3) at an initial adoption rate of 22.43 percent, corresponding to 24.55 percent of irrigated land and 
18.4 percent of rainfed land, in 2015 would most likely result in a 2.58 percent increase in total rice 
production in India.  
The results show that certain crops are more promising than others, and that all crops will likely 
not be adopted at the same proportional rate in each country or under each type of land. Drought-resistant 
crops are not designed to increase existing yield levels, but rather to help crops survive under drought 
conditions, acting like crop insurance. But at the aggregate level, they will provide a boost in average 
yields, therefore acting as yield-enhancing technologies for growers affected by drought. Because of the 
lack of relevant data, we assumed that crops resistant to abiotic stresses do not affect labor and chemical 
use, while crops resistant to biotic stresses generate labor and chemical productivity increases. 
Bangladesh has lower initial adoption rates in certain crops because we presume that the technology will 
take a longer time to spread than in India and other countries.  
To translate these data into usable inputs into the multi-market CGE model, we computed the 
aggregated relative productive effects of the composite GM crops. To do so, for each crop, we first 
summed the national productivity effects associated with each trait, and we divided these estimates by the 
sum of the adoption rates of each trait. For example, in the case of the most likely relative yield effects of 
rice in Bangladesh, we added the most likely absolute yield effects of the three traits used for rice (shown 
in the first three rows in Table 2) and divided it by the sum of the respective three total adoption rates 
(shown at the end of the same rows in Table 2). The ratio obtained is 2.52/49.2, which is equal to 5.12 
percent.6 
These relative parameters are presented in Table 6, but it is important to note that they are not all 
meaningful even if they are directly derived from estimated adoption and yield and input effects 
following the methodology described in this section. For example, it does not make sense to consider the 
effects of 100 percent national adoption of a drought-resistant variety when the productivity effects of 
such a variety will be effective in only 10 percent of the land. Moreover, these numbers would represent 
the effects of composite GM crops, which may be developed in the future but are not the main focus of 
current research programs. 
 
                                                      
5 The total adoption rates are derived as weighted averages of irrigated and rainfed land based on the IMPACT-Water 
model. 
6 The same method is used to derive relative input effects.    12
Table 6. Aggregate relative productivity factors and adoption rates of the composite GM crops for 
the countries of study used in the simulation model 
% Input effects  Crop  Country  % Yield effects 
Chemicals Labor 
Initial adoption 
Rice Bangladesh  5.12  -29.72  -5.2  49.2 
 India  8.38  -14.59  -3.78  71.74 
 Indonesia  3.44  -14.50  -8.79  63.92 
 Philippines  4.39  -60  -7.82  60.34 
Wheat Bangladesh  5.63  0  0  14.75 
 India  24.6  -6.02  -4.5  24.43 
Maize Bangladesh  10.55  -31.37  -5.9  51 
 India  21.99  -5.93  -3.89  30.88 
 Indonesia  5.63  -6.6  -3.43  45.44 
Soybeans India  8.59  -10.04  -7.04  9.66 
  Indonesia 18.79  -37.88  -5.11  83 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
For other countries and existing crops, the productivity shifts and adoption rates are derived from 
various farm-level and industry- or trade-level studies in each country. Our assumptions are shown in 
Table 7 with relative yields, input effects, and the initial adoption rates both under a first shock in the 
current GM-producing nations (noted I) and under a second, later shock, with larger adoption rates in a 
number of countries and a few added countries (noted II). For simplicity, and to isolate the effects of GM 
crops on certain countries, we assume that the adoption rates of countries that are already adopters in 
period I do not change in period II and we maintain the same productivity effects across periods. For 
maize, soybeans, and cotton, we use available ex post estimates, therefore only representing currently 
available traits that are pest resistant (maize, cotton), herbicide resistant (soybeans, maize, cotton), or both 
(maize, cotton) depending on the country. For rice, we assume that China will be a technology leader, but 
because of the lack of data, we only assume that China adopts Bt rice. For wheat, we assume that China 
and Argentina will use herbicide-resistant varieties.7   
                                                      
7 Some of the productivity assumptions shown in Table 7 (e.g., wheat and soybeans) are not completely comparable to the 
ones shown for our countries of study in Table 6 simply because the traits are not the same, and because the relative productivity 
effects shown in Table 6 represent composite (multi-trait) GM varieties rather than simple varieties.   13
Table 7. Relative productivity effects and initial adoption rates assumed for other countries  
% Input effects  % Initial adoption  Crop Country  %  Yield effects 
Chemicals Labor  I  II 
Rice China  IR  7.03  -65  -9.1 0  80 
Wheat China    7  0  -7.7  0  50 
 Argentina    7  0  -7.7  0  50 
Maize USA    9  -1.5  -5  52  52 
 Argentina  IR  5  0  -5  40  40 
  South Africa IR  32  0  -5  16  16 
 Philippines  IR  34  -52  -5  4  25 
 Canada  IR  5  0  -5  40  40 
 EU  (Spain)  IR  6.3  0  -5  5  5 
 Tanzania  and 
Uganda IR 
32 0  -5  0  25 
Soybeans Argentina  HT  -0.3  -43.2  -7.7  98  98 
 Brazil  HT  -3  -3  -7.7  41  41 
 USA  HT  0  0  -5  87  87 
  Canada HT   0  0  -5  50  50 
Cotton China  IR  7  -67  -6.7  70  90 
  USA IR+HT  11  -21  -2  81  81 
  Australia HT  0  -21  -2  40  40 
  India IR  34  -41  5  15  25 
  Mexico IR  9.7  -77  -5  61  61 
  Argentina IR  33.1  -46  -5  20  20 
  Brazil IR  33.1  -46  -5  4  4 
  South Africa IR  15.5  -23  -5  79  79 
  Tanzania and 
Uganda IR 
15.5 -23  -5  0  30 
Sources: Authors’ assumptions based on Elbehri and McDonald (2004); Qaim and Matuschke (2005); Marra, Pardey, and Alston 
(2002); and James (2005). 
Notes: IR = insect resistant, HT = herbicide tolerant. 
GM cotton is included because of its importance in developing countries and the fact that it is 
associated with increased cottonseed and cottonseed oil production, which are used for feed or food in a 
number of countries. Apart from current GM-adopting countries, we decided to add limited adoption of 
cotton and maize in Tanzania and Uganda as a supplementary experiment to our shock in Asia. Because 
these two countries do not export large volumes of either commodity we do not expect that they will 
influence the results of other countries too much, but we are interested in comparing their relative welfare 
changes with the ones in the countries of study.   14
4. TRADE MODELING AND SCENARIOS 
The methodology we propose to apply in our study is based on a multi-country, applied general 
equilibrium framework. A modified version of the MIRAGE model (Bchir et al. 2002)8 is used to 
simulate a range of scenarios on the productivity effect, trade restrictions, and segregation options. This 
model is based on the GTAP 6.1 database, which represents the world as of 2001. For this application, we 
divide the economy into 21 regions, including GM-producing countries, sensitive importing countries, 
and other important countries, and 19 sectors, including the relevant production sectors, as well as the 
chemical sector. The MIRAGE model includes an updated representation of trade policies and unilateral, 
bilateral, and multilateral trade preferential agreements (using MacMap-HS6; 2001 data).  
We first modify the MIRAGE model by dividing the five production sectors into GM and non-
GM substitutes for all GM-adopting countries. Second, with this structure, the model is changed to allow 
for the use of specific productivity shocks only on GM products in each GM sector for each adopting 
country. The model is also modified to allow for the ban of GM and/or non-GM imports in selected 
countries only from GM-producing nations going toward final consumption to reflect the current effects 
of labeling policies (Gruere 2006). We also allow the model to block imports from GM-producing 
countries going toward both final and intermediate consumption for selected food crops in certain 
scenarios. Lastly, the model is changed to allow for the introduction of a segregation cost for non-GM 
crops going from GM-adopting countries to sensitive importing ones.  
To calibrate the model, we use the assumed parameters provided in section 3 regarding the 
productivity shocks and the proposed initial adoption rates. However, because of the relative aggregated 
level of the GTAP database, we make four adjustments on the shocks and scenarios to the particular 
sectors we are interested in.  
First, on the product side, we use proportional weights derived from FAOSTAT national 
production data in 2001 to reduce the adoption rates for maize taking into account its contribution to the 
GTAP coarse grains sector, for cotton to the GTAP plant-based fiber sector, and for soybeans and 
cottonseed to the GTAP oilseeds sector.  
Second, we use a similar approach by reducing the productivity shock proportionally to account 
for the share of pesticide costs in the aggregated GTAP chemical sector for each GM crop concerned in 
each country. For cotton, this adjustment is done by weighing the share of pesticide costs in total 
chemical costs used in cotton production based on a survey of national production budgets (ICAC 2004). 
For all other GM crops, we use a two-step approach, first deriving the share of fertilizer in chemical use 
                                                      
8 The MIRAGE model was developed at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) in 
Paris. Full description of the model is available at the CEPII website (www.cepii.fr). 
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from FAOSTAT 2001, and second by using general data on the share of insecticides in total pesticide use 
at the continental level (Yudelman, Ratta, and Nygaard 1998).  
Third, for the case of countries adopting both GM cotton (and therefore cottonseed, an oilseed) 
and GM soybeans (another oilseed), we derive the productivity effect of a composite oilseed good. This is 
done by computing a weighted average of the respective productivity effects (yields, labor, chemical) of 
cotton and soybeans, using the expected share of GM cotton and GM soybeans in total oilseeds as 
respective weights. 
Fourth, for scenarios allowing the segregation of non-GM maize and soybeans, we adjust the 
segregation cost imposed for non-GM crops going to sensitive importing regions by accounting for the 
share of imports of these two crops into the coarse grains and oilseed sectors in 2001, respectively (using 
FAOSTAT bilateral database 2001).  
 After this data adjustment, under each set of scenarios, the model is calibrated to incorporate the 
assumed productivity shocks in all selected GM-adopting nations. Then under each scenario, we run the 
model only once to simulate a comparative static shock, and we use a perfect competition representation 
of the economy for simplification. Further refinements of our simulations could include dynamics and 
imperfect competition modeling.  
Table 8. GM-adopting countries and their producing GM sectors under each scenario set 
Set of 
scenarios 
Rice Wheat  Maize Cotton  fibers Oilseeds  (soybeans 
and cottonseed) 
A -None-  -None-  Argentina,  Canada, 
EU, Philippines, 















B -None-  -None-  Argentina, 
Bangladesh, 






























-None-  -None- -None- -None- 
WHEAT -None-  Argentina, 
Bangladesh, 
China, India 
-None- -None- -None- 
a Country producing only GM cottonseed and no GM soybeans as part of its oilseeds.   16
We define four distinct sets of scenarios as shown in Table 8. The first set, noted A, aims to 
represent 2005 GM-adopting nations and GM crops, namely maize, cotton, and oilseeds (soybeans and 
cottonseed),9 and it is run as a benchmark to compare with other types of shocks, using initial adoption 
rates defined in the I column of Table 7. The second set, noted B, includes the same GM crops adopted in 
the same countries, at a higher initial adoption rate in some countries (e.g., cotton in India, maize in the 
Philippines). In addition, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Tanzania and Uganda also adopt some of 
these GM crops. The initial adoption rates for these countries are defined in tables 2 through 5 and in the 
II column of Table 7. The third set, titled RICE, represents the case of the adoption of GM rice in the four 
countries of study and in China (using initial adoption rates defined in the relevant tables of section 3). In 
our consultation meetings, we found that local experts in the four Asian countries agreed that GM rice 
would enter their country only if China adopted it first. Lastly, the fourth set is named WHEAT and 
presents the introduction of GM wheat in Bangladesh, India, China, and Argentina, which are also 
assumed to be leaders in technology adoption. The initial adoption rates for rice and wheat are defined in 
tables 2 through 5 and in the II column of Table 7.  
We deliberately separate the case of current GM crops from the case of largely 
noncommercialized GM food crops (rice and wheat) for two reasons. First, we want to singularize the 
effect of adopting GM rice and GM wheat, two major food crops, from the current crops that are mostly 
used for animal feed and nonfood products. Second, we apply specific scenarios to these two last cases 
reflecting potential complete rejection in sensitive importing countries in the short run (which will not 
happen for GM crops of set A and B that are all currently traded).  
                                                      
9 We do not include canola explicitly in our model due to the lack of sufficient data on its productivity effect in adopting 
countries.    17











a The sensitive 
countries are the European Union, Rest of Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Australia/New Zealand
 




Productivity shock on 
GM crops 
Ban toward intermediate 
consumption in sensitive 
countries
a of 
Ban toward final 
consumption in sensitive 
countries
a of 
Segregation of non-GM 
product exported toward 
sensitive countries
a 
    Non-GM GM Non-GM GM   
0. Base 
 
No  No No No No  No 
1. Productivity shock 
 
Yes  No No No No  No 
2a. Import ban, no 
segregation
b 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  No 
2b. Import filter, no 
segregation 
Yes No  No  Yes  Yes No 
3a.i. Import ban, 
costless segregation
b 
Yes  No Yes No Yes  Yes 
3a-ii. Import ban, 5% 
segregation costs
b 
Yes  No Yes No Yes  Yes 
3b-i. Import filter, 
costless segregation 
Yes  No No No Yes  Yes 
3b-ii. Import filter, 5% 
cost segregation 
Yes  No No No Yes  Yes   18
Each set of scenarios comprises five to eight individual scenarios, as shown in Table 9. Scenario 
0 is run as a benchmark without GM production. We will not show its result, but it serves as a basis for 
the measured welfare changes in the other scenarios. Scenario 1 simulates a productivity shock associated 
with the adoption of GM crops and no trade restriction, that is, assuming all countries import and 
consume GM and non-GM crops with no differentiation.  
Scenarios 2a and 2b include the same productivity shock with trade restrictions. Scenario 2a is 
run only for the RICE and WHEAT sets, and represents the short-run effect of the adoption of new GM 
varieties, namely, the import ban of GM and non-GM crops from the adopting countries in sensitive 
countries. Scenario 2b is run for all sets, and represents current trade restrictions on GM imports in 
sensitive countries. Current marketing regulations, private standards, and consumer reactions in these 
countries act as a trade filter. Products to be used for final consumption are not purchased or approved, 
but products for intermediate consumption (such as animal feed) can enter the market in sensitive 
countries because the corresponding final products are not necessarily subject to labeling requirements 
(e.g., meat in the EU, soy oil in Japan; for more on labeling, see Gruere and Rao 2007).  
Lastly, scenarios 3a-i, 3a-ii, 3b-i, and 3b-ii allow for the segregation of non-GM products in GM-
adopting countries to export to sensitive importing countries. The four scenarios are proposed to study the 
implication of segregation costs under trade ban or trade filter. 3a-i is run with costless segregation of 
non-GM but a ban of GM toward both final and intermediate consumption; 3a-ii is the same scenario with 
the addition of a 5 percent basic segregation cost.10 Similarly, scenario 3b-i represents the case of a trade 
filter in sensitive countries but costless segregation of non-GM toward the final consumption; 3b-ii adds a 
5 percent segregation cost. As explained above, these costs have been adjusted according to differences in 
bilateral trade flows to account for the relative weight of concerned crops (e.g., maize) in aggregated 
sectors (coarse grains) imported by sensitive countries from GM-producing countries. 
                                                      
10 We choose to impose a 5 percent cost for two reasons: first, it corresponds to a median value in the literature on 
segregation cost (where estimates vary from a few percentage points to 10 to 15 percent); and second, it corresponds to the 
premium reported on the market for non-GM products. For instance, maize traders in South Africa reported in June 2007 that 
identity-preserved non-GM maize was sold for a 5 percent price premium compared with GM maize (personal conversation with 
GRAIN South Africa).    19
5. SIMULATION RESULTS 
What can be expected from the adoption of a GM technology? As noted before, the adoption of a GM 
technology often implies an increase in yields (productivity of land) and in the productivity of labor, 
which are equivalent to an augmentation of endowments of these productive factors. Thus, if we consider 
the theory of growth in open economies, it can be concluded that in terms of national welfare, the overall 
impact of GM crop adoption is ambiguous, as it can be decomposed into three effects: 
•  A technical gain effect. The direct effect of technical progress or augmented endowment on 
welfare is positive as it entails an expansion of the production possibility frontier. Under constant 
terms of trade, this generates an increase in national welfare. 
•  A term-of-trade effect. In general (see, e.g., de Melo and Grether 1997), technical progress or 
augmented endowment in a single country (or not in all countries) leads to a deterioration of 
terms of trade unless this is a marked anti-trade growth, which reduces export supply. But in the 
case of a pro-trade growth (e.g., productivity gains in the specialized export market), export 
supply is increased and export prices are reduced.  
•  A land supply effect. In the MIRAGE model, the land supply is endogenous. Technical progress 
in a country, resulting in increased yields or augmented endowment of land, for example, implies 
that production techniques are more land intensive. As a consequence, the labor/land or 
capital/land ratios decrease, which leads to a decline in the marginal productivity of land and its 
real remuneration. The land supply is a function of this remuneration, and consequently it is 
reduced. This is true in particular in countries where land supply is relatively elastic such as 
Australia/New Zealand or Argentina.  
The two first effects are traditional effects of the theory of international trade; the third one is 
specific to the MIRAGE model.  
According to the theory of international trade, the second effect (terms of trade) can be negative 
and greater than the first effect; this is the famous case of “immiserizing growth,” first illustrated by 
Bhagwati (1958).  
We present the results in terms of welfare effects, defined as the equivalent variation (or real 
income) between each scenario and the base (0) for each set. Both absolute values in millions of dollars 
per year ($ million/year) and percentage (%) of total real income are shown for each region in each 
scenario. We also provide additional data on production, imports, and exports in the appendix (see tables 
A1, A2, A3, and A4) to explain the results obtained in some of the scenarios.  
A) GM Maize, Oilseeds, and Cotton 
Table 10 shows the results for set A. Rows representing GM-adopting nations are shaded in the table and 
their names are in boldface. This case represents the adoption of current GM crops, namely, soybeans, 
maize, and cotton. The global welfare gain with the adoption of these crops and without trade restrictions 
amounts to $4.4 billion, which lies within the ranges obtained in other studies presented in Table 1. The   20
global welfare gain declines to $2.7 billion with a trade filter applied in sensitive countries, but it rises 
back up to $4.2 billion with costless segregation. With 5 percent segregation costs, the global welfare gain 
lies in between the costless segregation and trade restriction scenarios at $3.7 billion. These results 
already bring forward three lessons: (1) trade restrictions and consumer resistance reduces the gain in 
global welfare  by about $1.7 billion; (2) the global opportunity cost of a non-GM segregation system for 
these crops is about $1.4 billion; (3) the global welfare gain would be greater even with a 5 percent cost 
of segregation than with no segregation. 
The adoption of GM crops consistently results in an increase in welfare in all adopting countries 
except Australia/New Zealand and Argentina. Australia and New Zealand partially adopt Bt cotton (at a 
relatively low level) and experience losses in terms of trade (see the previous second effect). Argentina 
experiences a significant loss, which can be explained partially by our productivity assumptions and by its 
loss in competitive edge in the vegetal oil sector in the global market. At the domestic level, Argentina 
experiences a degradation of the returns to land (see the previous land supply effect), accompanied by less 
production of oilseeds and therefore less vegetal oils, because we assume the yield effects of GM 
soybeans to be negative. At the international level, it also exports much less vegetal oils at a lower export 
price. The adoption of GM soybeans and cottonseed in many countries increases oilseed production, 
which reduces prices and contracts the international oilseed market. As a result, most countries reduce 
their exports of oilseeds and indirectly vegetal oils. At the same time, trade diversion occurs in the vegetal 
oil market, where Argentina loses market share to the United States, Brazil, and the Rest of Asia. 
Traditional importers of Argentinean oil such as India, by producing more cottonseed, also import much 
less oil.  
The largest relative gains from GM crop adoption are experienced by India (+0.07 percent), 
followed by China and Mexico, because of the relative importance of the targeted crops in these 
countries. All adopters except Mexico and China experience a relative decline in the total welfare gain 
with trade restrictions. The exception of Mexico and China is related to the fact that they only adopt Bt 
cotton at a relatively high level and they import commodities at a reduced price (maize in Mexico, cotton 
in China) under trade restrictions. This has to be related to diverted trade: sensitive countries import less 
of these products and the export supply of these products is redirected to nonsensitive countries. The 
cotton sector is affected differently than the other two sectors with a trade filter, because these restrictions 
affect only products going toward final consumption and most cotton is used for intermediate 
consumption, and because no importer is regulating GM cotton imports. Simulation data (Table A.1) 
show that Mexico and China export less cotton under the second scenario but produce and import about 
the same amount. Costless segregation helps most GM-adopting countries, offsetting a large share of the   21
relative losses with trade policies. Overall, the presence of a 5 percent segregation cost reduces their gains 
but still allows them to be better off than with no segregation.  
Sensitive countries largely account for most of the relative decline in global welfare under trade 
restrictions, and are better off with costless segregation. Among the five regions, only Japan is worse off 
with costly segregation than with trade restrictions. This means that Japan would be better off only if the 
segregation costs for non-GM products stay under 5 percent. Europe and South Korea suffer apparent 
welfare losses under scenario 2b, due to the implementation of restrictive trade policies.11  
 
                                                      
11 However, these apparent market losses may not be actual welfare losses, as we do not account for the fact that consumers 
in these countries may prefer non-GM food and be willing to pay more to avoid GM food.   22
Table 10. Change in welfare effects ($ million/yr and %) under each scenario of set A: adoption of GM maize, soybeans, and/or cotton 
Scenario set A  
Bold regions adopt GM maize, soybeans, 
and/or cotton  
1. Productivity shock   2b. Import filter, no 
segregation 
3b-i. Import filter, 
costless segregation 
3b-ii. Import filter, 5% 
cost segregation 
Region   $ million  %  $ million  %  $ million  %  $ million  % 
Australia and New Zealand  -50.344  -0.015  -52.728  -0.016  -49.286  -0.015  -46.446  -0.014 
China  341.905  0.044  347.346  0.045  346.006  0.045  346.887  0.045 
Japan  430.112  0.014 264.797  0.009 415.619  0.014 256.777  0.008 
South  Korea  353.145 0.122  -521.276  -0.180  200.850 0.069  50.076 0.017 
Rest  of  Asia  136.167  0.024 148.412  0.026 136.944  0.024 139.517  0.025 
Indonesia  40.679  0.041 42.957  0.044 41.027  0.042 41.105  0.042 
Philippines  29.171  0.046  28.974  0.046  29.154  0.046  28.892  0.046 
Bangladesh -0.208  -0.001  -0.225  -0.001 -0.257 -0.001 -0.212 -0.001 
India  254.173  0.068  249.856  0.067  254.652  0.068  252.632  0.068 
Canada  41.054  0.008  38.621  0.007  41.677  0.008  43.370  0.008 
United States  1856.187  0.022  1854.162  0.022  1859.333  0.022  1867.961  0.022 
Mexico  332.332  0.069  335.539  0.070  332.712  0.069  333.291  0.069 
Rest  of  Latin  America  104.308  0.021 120.628  0.024 105.751  0.021 108.942  0.021 
Argentina  -277.653  -0.122  -287.039  -0.127  -280.236  -0.124  -279.267  -0.123 
Brazil  26.257  0.007  9.484  0.002  28.717  0.007  13.538  0.003 
European Union  494.483  0.008  -113.287  -0.002  423.483  0.006  274.592  0.004 
Rest  of  Europe  41.120 0.006  -7.286  -0.001  38.933 0.006  24.331 0.004 
North Africa and Middle East  249.477  0.031  251.109  0.031  249.622  0.031  249.319  0.031 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -2.965  -0.002  29.318  0.018 -1.306 -0.001 -0.498  0.000 
South Africa  19.721  0.023  19.353  0.022  19.936  0.023  19.406  0.022 
Tanzania  and  Uganda  0.460 0.003 0.725 0.005 0.469 0.003 0.404 0.003 
World  4419.583  0.018 2759.440  0.011 4193.798  0.017 3724.616  0.015 
Source: Authors’ results from simulations.   
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Lastly, the results obtained in the region titled Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa are quite remarkable. 
In this region, which neither adopts nor restricts GM crop imports, the welfare effects vary largely across 
scenarios, from -$3 million in scenario 1 to -$1 million for the scenarios with segregation in sensitive 
countries, and reaching a maximum of +$29 million in scenario 2b, with trade filtering and no 
segregation. This means that these countries benefit from the combination of GM maize, soybeans, and 
cotton with restrictive policies in Europe. As importers they benefit from the lower import prices they can 
obtain due to the excess surplus in other countries. This phenomenon is also true for other nonproducing 
and nonsensitive countries, such as Tanzania/Uganda, Indonesia, Rest of Latin America, Bangladesh, and 
North Africa/Middle East, who all share maximum gains under scenario 2b.  
The welfare results for set B are presented in Table 11. In this case, more countries are producing 
GM crops and some of the adopting GM-producing countries also increase their rate of adoption. As a 
consequence, the gain in global welfare increases to $5.1 billion. The global gain follows the same pattern 
as in set A, reaching the lowest level under scenario 2b with trade filtering and no segregation, and 
intermediate levels under scenarios 3b-i and 3b-ii. Applying a trade filter results in a relative reduction of 
gains of 32.5 percent, a difference smaller than the one obtained in set A (-37 percent). The largest 
relative gains with GM adoption (scenario 1) are derived in Tanzania/Uganda (+0.32 percent), then in 
India (+0.22 percent), and the Philippines (+0.19 percent). On the other hand, Argentina loses a little 
more, mainly because of the increased oilseed production in India, reducing its vegetal oils exports even 
more than under set A. China’s relative gains also decline between set A and set B mostly due to a change 
in the competitiveness of its textile industry. 
The four countries of study gain from GM adoption, but experience different relative changes in 
gains across scenarios. By adopting GM maize at a low rate, Bangladesh experiences a small gain, despite 
increasing its production of cereals. These gains do not vary significantly across scenarios, but as a net 
food importer Bangladesh is slightly better off under trade restrictions. India’s extension of Bt cotton 
adoption, with adoption of GM maize and soybeans, increases its gains from $254 million in set A to 
$826 million in set B. Trade restrictions reduce these gains by only about $4 million. India gains slightly 
more under scenario 3b-i (costless segregation) than under scenario 1, but the difference is insignificant in 
relative terms. India is still slightly better off with 5 percent segregation costs than with trade restriction. 
Indonesia adopts GM maize and soybeans, which results in gains reaching $110 million, or 0.12 percent 
of total real income. Indonesia remains a net importer of coarse grains and oilseeds, which may explain 
why it gets slightly larger gains under the most restrictive scenario (2b) that result in lower import prices. 
But the difference is about $1 million and less than 1 percent of the gains it obtains with the adoption of 
GM crops. Lastly, the Philippines extends its adoption of GM maize, and multiplies by four its welfare 
gains obtained under set A to reach $120 million. Like Indonesia, the Philippines is not a net exporter of 
any of these crops, and imports a number of agricultural commodities. As a result the gains do not change 
much under the four scenarios.  
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Table 11. Change in welfare effects ($ million/yr and %) under each scenario of set B: extended adoption of GM maize, soybeans, and/or 
cotton 
Scenario set B 
Same as set A plus Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, 
Philippines, and Tanzania/Uganda adopt GM maize, 
cotton, and/or soybeans 
1. Productivity shock   2b. Import filter, no 
segregation 
3b-i. Import filter, 
costless segregation 
3b-ii. Import filter, 5% 
cost segregation 
Region  $ million  %  $ million  %  $ million  %  $ million  % 
Australia and New Zealand  -53.062  -0.016  -55.449  -0.017  -51.994  -0.016  -49.154  -0.015 
China  242.399  0.031  247.754  0.032  246.380  0.032  247.285  0.032 
Japan  435.365 0.014  271.491 0.009  420.792 0.014  261.864 0.009 
South  Korea  360.583 0.125  -515.855  -0.178  208.357 0.072  57.709 0.020 
Rest  of  Asia  143.124 0.025  155.671 0.027  143.888 0.025  146.457 0.026 
Indonesia  113.213  0.115  114.480  0.116  113.553  0.115  113.639  0.115 
Philippines  120.197  0.191  120.010  0.191  120.179  0.191  119.918  0.191 
Bangladesh  1.008  0.003  1.015  0.003  0.959  0.003  1.004  0.003 
India  825.588  0.221  821.383  0.220  826.075  0.222  824.106  0.221 
Canada  39.428  0.007  37.009  0.007  40.051  0.007  41.738  0.008 
United States  1848.543  0.022  1846.500  0.022  1851.711  0.022  1860.343  0.022 
Mexico  333.683  0.070  336.899  0.070  334.060  0.070  334.641  0.070 
Rest  of  Latin  America  103.975 0.021  120.600 0.024  105.416 0.021  108.608 0.021 
Argentina  -282.945  -0.125  -292.327  -0.129  -285.527  -0.126  -284.556  -0.125 
Brazil  27.534  0.007  10.876  0.003  30.029  0.008  14.790  0.004 
European Union  506.163  0.008  -106.192  -0.002  435.085  0.007  286.030  0.004 
Rest of Europe  43.566  0.006  -5.092  -0.001  41.346  0.006  26.728  0.004 
North Africa and Middle East  256.574  0.032  258.226  0.032  256.716  0.032  256.414  0.032 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -2.877  -0.002  30.122  0.019 -1.217 -0.001 -0.420  0.000 
South Africa  20.568  0.024  20.198  0.023  20.782  0.024  20.254  0.023 
Tanzania and Uganda  44.558  0.322  44.262  0.319  44.558  0.322  44.523  0.321 
World  5127.184 0.021  3461.578 0.014  4901.200 0.020  4431.919 0.018 
Source: Authors’ results from simulations.  
25 
The largest relative losses with trade restrictions are still borne by the sensitive importers, 
particularly South Korea. Under set A, South Korea was losing about $874 million with the introduction 
of trade restrictions (compared with scenario 1). Under set B it loses about the same amount, $875 
million. The other sensitive regions experience small relative losses. Once again, Japan is slightly better 
off in a case with trade restrictions and no segregation than under cases of costly segregation, because 
even with the filter it is able to import the targeted products (that are mostly used for intermediate 
consumption) at a lower price than in these other scenarios.  
Lastly, we find the same pattern as in set A for the non-GM-producing and nonsensitive region 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (and to a lesser extent Rest of Latin America and Rest of Asia), with 
maximum gains under the most restrictive scenario (2b). In this case, Sub-Saharan African countries 
experience small losses ($1–$3 million) under all scenarios but 2b, under which they gain $30 million.  
B) GM Rice Adoption 
Table 12 shows the changes in welfare effects for set RICE. In this case, five countries adopt GM rice: 
China, India, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Currently GM rice is being tested in China and 
India but has not been approved for cultivation in those two countries. The United States approved the use 
of herbicide-tolerant rice in 2006, but it is not cultivated because of fears of export losses. Iran has 
reportedly approved the cultivation of Bt rice, and it could be the only country producing GM rice at a 
small scale. We decided to neglect limited potential GM rice production in those two countries in order to 
isolate the shock with the adoption of GM rice in five Asian countries that are all relatively large 
producers and consumers of rice. In this set, we added scenario 2a, which corresponds to the short-run 
effect of GM rice adoption, i.e., a complete ban in sensitive countries. We also added scenarios 3a-i and 
3a-ii, which are the equivalent of 3b-i and 3b-ii but with blocking of GM rice toward both final and 
intermediate consumption.  
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Table 12. Change in welfare effects ($ million/yr and % total) under each scenario with GM rice adoption in selected Asian countries  
GM rice adopted in bold regions  1. Productivity 
shock 
2a. Import ban, 
no segregation 
2b. Import filter, 
no segregation 
3a-i. Import ban, 
costless 
segregation 









Region  $ million % $ million % $ million % $ million % $ million % $ million % $ million %
Australia and New Zealand  -5.543-0.002 -4.311 -0.001 -6.075 -0.002 -4.954 -0.002 0.405 0.000 -5.799 -0.002 -0.545 0.000
China  4640.502 0.597 4617.579 0.594 4632.954 0.596 4627.666 0.596 4640.500 0.597 4636.040 0.597 4649.711 0.598
Japan 529.709 0.017 -292.492 -0.010 211.181 0.007 93.964 0.003 -131.621 -0.004 357.851 0.012 153.150 0.005
South Korea  191.106 0.066 -159.492 -0.055 165.182 0.057 21.943 0.008 -182.653 -0.063 177.587 0.061 -10.040 -0.004
Rest of Asia  -8.469-0.002 -0.942 0.000 -5.830 -0.001 -6.432 -0.001 0.166 0.000 -7.474 -0.001 -1.285 0.000
Indonesia  1106.760 1.121 1102.298 1.116 1105.090 1.119 1105.502 1.119 1106.368 1.120 1106.210 1.120 1107.251 1.121
Philippines  638.752 1.017 637.598 1.015 638.458 1.016 638.240 1.016 638.041 1.016 638.619 1.017 638.466 1.016
Bangladesh  452.620 1.194 452.809 1.195 452.720 1.194 452.688 1.194 452.781 1.195 452.664 1.194 452.751 1.195
India  3258.806 0.874 3241.439 0.869 3252.751 0.872 3252.359 0.872 3250.822 0.872 3256.347 0.873 3255.455 0.873
Canada 10.288 0.002 10.886 0.002 10.547 0.002 10.539 0.002 16.322 0.003 10.406 0.002 16.171 0.003
United States  104.256 0.001 101.579 0.001 104.912 0.001 103.186 0.001 105.300 0.001 104.639 0.001 106.919 0.001
Mexico 6.097 0.001 5.180 0.001 5.877 0.001 5.661 0.001 8.742 0.002 5.987 0.001 9.105 0.002
Rest of Latin America  28.080 0.006 33.134 0.007 29.391 0.006 30.174 0.006 36.137 0.007 28.682 0.006 34.414 0.007
Argentina -1.783-0.001 -1.456 -0.001 -1.798 -0.001 -1.631 -0.001 -10.168 -0.005 -1.789 -0.001 -10.346 -0.005
Brazil -0.814 0.000 -0.416 0.000 -0.714 0.000 -0.623 0.000 -30.130 -0.008 -0.764 0.000 -30.282 -0.008
European Union  350.235 0.005 -61.022 -0.001 194.811 0.003 165.029 0.003 -58.655 -0.001 276.452 0.004 67.100 0.001
Rest of Europe  38.648 0.006 14.850 0.002 27.266 0.004 26.207 0.004 7.794 0.001 32.631 0.005 14.721 0.002
North Africa and Middle East  105.535 0.013 106.017 0.013 106.496 0.013 105.398 0.013 105.340 0.013 105.899 0.013 105.857 0.013
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  74.142 0.046 73.451 0.045 74.408 0.046 73.691 0.046 74.676 0.046 74.235 0.046 75.264 0.047
South Africa  13.386 0.015 13.250 0.015 13.402 0.015 13.308 0.015 12.493 0.014 13.389 0.015 12.583 0.014
Tanzania and Uganda  1.587 0.012 1.565 0.011 1.600 0.012 1.568 0.011 1.538 0.011 1.591 0.012 1.563 0.011
World 11533.902 0.047 9891.504 0.04011012.627 0.04510713.482 0.04410044.200 0.04111263.402 0.04610647.985 0.043
Source: Authors’ results from simulations. 
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First, Table 12 shows that the global welfare gain with the adoption of GM rice is much larger 
than under the two previous sets, ranging from $9.9 billion to $11.5 billion per year. Trade restrictions in 
the form of an import ban in sensitive countries reduce the gain by 14 percent, less than in sets A and B. 
In other words the gain with GM rice adoption is about seven times larger than any potential loss 
experienced due to trade restrictions. Segregation at a 5 percent cost reduces the global gain by about 6 
percent. Interestingly, segregation at a 5 percent cost also results in a lower global gain than a trade filter, 
which indicates that, provided rice is accepted in intermediate consumption, segregation would increase 
the global welfare gain if it does not cost too much.  
The major welfare gains occur in the five adopting countries. First, China, with a relatively large 
adoption rate, gains more than $4.6 billion per year (or 0.6 percent of total real income). This total is 
slightly larger than that obtained in Huang et al. (2004), because we do not explicitly reduce the gain from 
GM crops due to the price of seeds. Therefore the gain presented here includes the returns to the 
developers and adopting producers together. In the GTAP database used in this study, China’s rice 
imports are just slightly inferior to its exports, making it a small net exporter. This may explain why an 
embargo on rice slightly reduces China’s gain, a trade filter reduces it a little less, and the welfare gain 
with costless segregation is close to that in the first scenario. But at the same time, China obtains slightly 
higher gains with costly segregation in sensitive countries than under other scenarios.  
India also obtains a large positive gain from adoption, exceeding $3.2 billion, or 0.87 percent of 
total welfare. But India is a net exporter of rice and therefore it gains less with trade restrictions and more 
with segregation. Interestingly, in opposition to the widespread belief that GM rice would result in 
extremely important losses for the economy, the net reduction in welfare gain with a complete ban of rice 
in sensitive countries amounts to only $17 million, representing only 0.5 percent of the total gain with 
GM rice adoption. This can be explained by the fact that India does not export as much to Europe (about 
16 percent according to the original GTAP database) as it does to other regions, such as North Africa and 
the Middle East (47 percent) and other African countries (19 percent), and that trade diversion occurs 
with selective bans. Bilateral trade flows show that under scenario 2a, Indian rice is slightly diverted from 
Europe to South and North America and African countries. In total, under the trade ban, India produces 
16 percent more than without GM rice, which is less than under other scenarios. It reduces total rice 
exports by 6 percent but still reduces its total rice imports by more than 50 percent (see Table A.3 in the 
appendix). Under scenario 2b, India’s welfare is reduced by a much smaller amount. Segregation allows 
an increase in welfare by a few million dollars even at 5 percent costs.  
Bangladesh obtains the largest relative gain with the adoption of GM rice, with an additional 1.2 
percent gain in total welfare per year, which is equivalent to more than $450 million per year. Rice 
production increases by 7.5 percent under all scenarios, which allows the country to reduce rice imports  
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by more than 27 percent. The trade ban results in a significant relative reduction in exports, but this loss is 
limited as the absolute value of its rice exports is small ($1 million in the GTAP database) compared with 
its imports ($74 million). As a net importer, Bangladesh is slightly better under the most restrictive trade 
scenarios, because they are associated with relatively lower import prices, particularly for non-GM rice.  
Indonesia also obtains very significant gains from GM rice adoption, exceeding $1.1 billion per 
year, or 1.1 percent of total welfare. Indonesia is also a large net importer of rice. With GM rice, 
Indonesia increases its production by 20 percent and reduces its imports by 66 percent. A total trade ban 
in the short run has a small effect on Indonesia’s welfare with a reduction of $4 million. Indonesia is 
slightly better off with a trade filter, and with segregation, but the differences are very small relative to the 
total gains.  
The Philippines increases its welfare by 1 percent (or about $640 million) annually by adopting 
GM rice. Originally a net importer, the introduction of GM rice results in a production increase of about 
17 to 19 percent under all scenarios, and reduces imports by more than half. The changes across scenarios 
are very small, resulting from production and import differences with price changes.  
The relative loss experienced by sensitive importers from a total ban on rice coming from GM-
adopting countries explains almost the entirety of the difference in global welfare across scenarios. In the 
group, Japan loses the most from a total ban and gains the most from a trade filter and costless 
segregation. Once again Japan’s welfare rapidly declines with an increase in the segregation costs. Europe 
loses a small relative amount under the total ban but still gains under all other scenarios as a net importer 
of rice. Apart from that, we do not find the same result as in set A or set B for the Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa region. Although it gains more in absolute value than in sets A or B, the gains are very similar 
across scenarios.  
C) GM Wheat 
Lastly, Table 13 shows the results obtained with the WHEAT set, in which China, Argentina, India, and 
Bangladesh adopt GM wheat. The global gain is much less than with GM rice adoption, ranging between 
$1.6 billion and $2.3 billion annually. It is important to note that although Argentina, India, and China are 
relatively large producers of wheat, other countries of North America, Europe, or Oceania dominate the 
global wheat market. Global real income decreases only minimally with trade restrictions (2a or 2b) 
compared with the simple productivity shock (1), but reduces more significantly with the introduction of 
costs of segregation (3a-ii and 3b-ii). For comparison with previous scenarios, trade restrictions reduce 
welfare gains by 1.3 percent, while costly segregation reduces welfare gains by up to 30 percent. Most of 
the relative losses with costly segregation occur in sensitive countries, mostly Japan and South Korea, 
who have to pay more for imports of wheat. These same importers incur only relatively small reductions  
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in welfare gains with trade bans because they are able to source their imported wheat from other 
countries, notably North America and Australia.  
China increases its welfare by 0.09 percent (or $690 million) with GM wheat. The country 
increases its wheat production by 9 percent and reduces its imports by more than 40 percent. Trade 
restrictions do not affect its welfare gains significantly; however, adding a cost of segregation does 
increase China’s total welfare gains, because it results in a small increase in exports to other countries (as 
shown in Table A.4). China exports about $42 million of wheat and imports 10 times more. The costly 
segregation scenario divides the market into GM (or mixed) and pure non-GM, and the non-GM export 
price to sensitive countries goes up significantly, while the GM price is slightly reduced, which could 
explain the observed gain. 
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Table 13. Change in welfare effects ($ million/yr and %) under each scenario with GM wheat adoption in selected Asian countries 
GM wheat adopted in bold regions 1. Productivity 
shock 
2a. Import ban, 
no segregation 
2b. Import filter, 
no segregation 
3a-i. Import ban, 
costless 
segregation 









Region  $ million % $ million % $ million % $ million % $ million % $ million % $ million %
Australia and New Zealand  -21.171 -0.006 -15.979 -0.005 -21.168 -0.006 -19.967 -0.006 -14.365 -0.004 -21.170 -0.006 -15.683 -0.005
China  687.831 0.089 684.036 0.088 687.814 0.089 686.492 0.088 698.860 0.090 687.825 0.089 700.282 0.090
Japan 57.924 0.002 51.499 0.002 57.909 0.002 56.454 0.002 -175.323 -0.006 57.921 0.002 -173.753 -0.006
South Korea  15.359 0.005 -2.521 -0.001 15.341 0.005 10.894 0.004 -196.794 -0.068 15.354 0.005 -192.110 -0.066
Rest of Asia  14.773 0.003 13.795 0.002 14.773 0.003 14.498 0.003 20.953 0.004 14.773 0.003 21.251 0.004
Indonesia  4.298 0.004 4.010 0.004 4.298 0.004 4.219 0.004 5.310 0.005 4.298 0.004 5.396 0.006
Philippines 9.137 0.015 8.905 0.014 9.137 0.015 9.066 0.014 8.809 0.014 9.137 0.015 8.885 0.014
Bangladesh  10.373 0.027 10.556 0.028 10.376 0.027 10.389 0.027 10.502 0.028 10.374 0.027 10.485 0.028
India  945.243 0.254 940.520 0.252 945.192 0.254 944.655 0.253 942.633 0.253 945.235 0.254 943.277 0.253
Canada -28.410 -0.005 -26.277 -0.005 -28.403 -0.005 -27.921 -0.005 -22.045 -0.004 -28.408 -0.005 -22.576 -0.004
United States  14.295 0.000 20.180 0.000 14.303 0.000 15.747 0.000 18.114 0.000 14.297 0.000 16.527 0.000
Mexico 2.482 0.001 2.045 0.000 2.480 0.001 2.376 0.001 5.418 0.001 2.481 0.001 5.531 0.001
Rest of Latin America  10.706 0.002 10.417 0.002 10.713 0.002 10.698 0.002 16.589 0.003 10.710 0.002 16.609 0.003
Argentina  215.369 0.095 212.716 0.094 215.229 0.095 214.158 0.094 205.847 0.091 215.309 0.095 206.997 0.091
Brazil 76.945 0.019 77.349 0.019 76.965 0.019 77.110 0.019 47.503 0.012 76.953 0.019 47.346 0.012
European Union  75.661 0.001 73.376 0.001 75.558 0.001 74.940 0.001 -146.386 -0.002 75.629 0.001 -145.686 -0.002
Rest of Europe  10.819 0.002 9.076 0.001 10.598 0.002 10.170 0.002 -8.411 -0.001 10.745 0.002 -7.841 -0.001
North Africa and Middle East  132.897 0.017 131.585 0.016 132.923 0.017 132.591 0.016 132.540 0.016 132.907 0.017 132.896 0.017
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  16.940 0.011 16.743 0.010 16.943 0.011 16.869 0.010 17.803 0.011 16.941 0.011 17.880 0.011
South Africa  9.201 0.011 9.234 0.011 9.204 0.011 9.226 0.011 8.399 0.010 9.202 0.011 8.376 0.010
Tanzania and Uganda  0.616 0.004 0.538 0.004 0.616 0.004 0.597 0.004 0.563 0.004 0.616 0.004 0.584 0.004
World 2261.288 0.009 2231.802 0.009 2260.801 0.0092253.260 0.009 1576.519 0.006 2261.127 0.009 1584.675 0.006
Source: Authors’ results from simulations. 
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Bangladesh is also a large importer of wheat, and only adopts GM wheat at a partial scale in this 
set of scenarios, for a small overall production, which is reflected by the small gains. Overall, Bangladesh 
produces 4 percent less wheat, imports a little less wheat, and exports less wheat. Thus, under our 
assumptions, Bangladesh absorbs less wheat overall and is not able to compete with India and the other 
GM wheat producers.  
India is the main winner from GM wheat adoption, with gains of more than $940 million per year 
(or 0.25 percent of total real income). As a net exporter India gains more under scenarios 1 and 3a/3b and 
less with complete trade restriction under scenario 2a or 2b. Once again, the loss with a complete ban in 
sensitive countries is negligible ($5 million) compared with the gains with the adoption of GM wheat. 
Costless segregation does not make much difference with the trade filter scenario, which can be 
understood by the fact that virtually all wheat is used in intermediate consumption and not final 
consumption in importing sensitive countries. Costly segregation reduces the gain slightly but still allows 
India to be better off than under a complete ban. Argentina follows the same pattern as India with a 




The results of our multi-market CGE simulations vary across regions and scenarios, but they share a 
number of similarities that can help us draw a few general lessons. First, our simulations show once again 
that the adoption of GM crops can be translated into significant economic gains in the large majority of 
regions and in the presence or absence of trade restrictions in certain sensitive countries. Only a few 
regions experience net losses with the adoption of GM crops due to large changes in export-sensitive 
sectors. However, these rich countries have adopted restrictive policies in response to consumer concerns 
based on risk perceptions, lack of trust in safety authorities, and environmental or ethical reasons that can 
be translated into a consumer willingness to pay to avoid GM food products (not accounted here), so these 
real income losses might not be actual welfare losses. The results also show that adopting GM crops 
generates relatively larger gains for developing countries with rural economies. For example, the second 
set of simulations with current GM crops shows that Tanzania and Uganda would gain more relatively by 
adopting GM maize and cotton at a relatively low rate than any other country or region.  
Second, our simulations show that although trade regulations can affect the gains from GM crops, 
the effect is relatively small compared with the gains under the adoption of GM crops. Applying a trade 
filter that allows only products for intermediate consumption to be imported, which reflects the regulatory 
situation faced by current GM crops, reduces the gains of exporting GM-adopting countries. Similarly a 
complete ban of rice or wheat from GM-producing countries by sensitive countries would result in lower 
gains for GM crop exporters. Yet, even with these barriers, most GM-adopting countries still gain from 
the adoption of GM crops, because the relative losses they experience with trade restriction are very small 
compared with the productivity gains experienced domestically, even with partial adoption. Table 14 
shows the relative change in gains out of the total gain from GM crops under the most restrictive 
scenarios of each set. Even if globally the gains are reduced by up to 38 percent overall, we find that the 
gain reduction is closer to 1 percent in most cases for our countries of study and China, and does not 
exceed 6.7 percent of total gains. Interestingly, in certain cases trade restriction even results in a relative 
increase in gains for certain net importers or nonadopters.   
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Table 14. Relative effect of trade restriction on total gains from GM crop adoption for selected 
countries in different sets of scenarios 
Set  Set A  Set B  Rice  Wheat 
Scenarios compared  1 vs. 2b  1 vs. 2b  1 vs. 2a  1 vs. 2a 
China 1.6%  2.2%  -0.5%  -0.6% 
Bangladesh n.a.  0.7%  0.0%  1.8% 
India -1.7%  -0.5%  -0.5%  -0.5% 
Indonesia n.a.  1.1%  -0.4%  -6.7% 
Philippines -0.7%  -0.2%  -0.2%  -2.5% 
World -37.6%  -32.5%  -14.2%  -1.3% 
Source: Simulation results.  
Note: n.a. = not adopting GM crops in this scenario. 
Third, the use of segregation for non-GM crops can help offset some of the relative losses from 
trade restrictions. Differences between the trade scenario and the hypothetical case with costless 
segregation provide benchmark values for the opportunity cost of segregation, defined as the most a 
country could spend on segregation to avoid losing compared with trade restrictions with no segregation. 
Estimates of these opportunity costs are reported for selected countries in tables 15 and 16 in the cases of 
rice and wheat (as well as in Table A.6 in the appendix for set A and B crops). 
Table 15. Opportunity cost ($ million/yr) of the segregation of non-GM rice for adopting and 
sensitive countries 
Type of country  Country  Segregation of non-GM rice 
for final consumption only  
Segregation of non-GM rice for final 
and intermediate consumption 
GM producers 
  China 3.1  10.09 
  India 3.6  10.92 
  Indonesia -1.9  3.2 
  Bangladesh -0.06  -0.12 
  Philippines 0.16  0.64 
Total GM producers  4.9  24.73 
Sensitive countries 
  Australia/NZ 0.28  -0.64 
  Japan 113.67  198.53 
  South Korea  12.47  137.55 
  EU 81.64  226.05 
  Rest of Europe 5.37  11.36 
Total sensitive countries  213.43  572.85 
WORLD     
Global  250.78 821.98   
Source: Authors’ derivations.  
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Table 16. Opportunity cost ($ million/yr) of the segregation of non-GM wheat for adopting and 
sensitive countries 
Type of country  Country  Segregation of non-GM wheat 
for final consumption only  
Segregation of non-GM wheat for final 
and intermediate consumption 
GM producers 
  China 0.01  2.46 
  India 0.04  4.14 
  Bangladesh 0  -0.17 
  Argentina 0.08  1.44 
Total GM producers  0.13  7.87 
Sensitive countries 
  Australia/NZ 0  -3.99 
  Japan 0.01  4.96 
  South Korea  0.01  13.42 
  EU 0.07  1.56 
  Rest of Europe  0.14  1.09 
Total sensitive countries  0.23  17.04 
WORLD     
Global 0.33  21.46 
Source: Authors’ derivations. 
These results show that exporting GM-producing countries, such as India, have a positive but 
relatively limited opportunity cost of segregation. The results also show that most of the global benefits of 
segregation would occur in importing sensitive countries (as shown in tables 15, 16, and A6) rather than 
exporting GM-producing countries. This means that traders in sensitive countries will likely have a larger 
incentive to set up segregation systems in GM-adopting countries than the exporters in those latter 
countries themselves. Consequently, these results suggest that the adoption of new GM crops may not 
necessarily require high investment by traders willing to keep their market in sensitive countries. Because 
the immediate cost of bans will largely be borne by importers, they will have a clear incentive to invest in 
segregation. 
More generally, by simulating costly segregation scenarios we show that in many cases, GM-
crop-adopting countries will still gain from segregation even with a 5 percent cost (e.g., India for rice), 
while in other cases, such countries will gain only if the cost of segregation is lower (e.g., India for 
wheat). As expected, segregation for export is not a silver bullet to avoid trade losses—it all depends on 
the cost of doing so. Competitive transition economies (like India) that are already able to supply high-
quality agricultural products (including niche market products) to sensitive importing countries should be  
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able to take advantage of this option in an efficient way, particularly if the cost of entry is partially 
assumed by importers. Smaller developing countries may have less incentive and support to set up 
segregation systems, unless such setup is driven domestically by a strong niche market for non-GM 
products.  
Fourth, the case of importing developing nations is different. With the examples of Bangladesh or 
Indonesia, we saw that large importers will not become net exporters with limited adoption of GM crops. 
Their opportunity cost of segregation is negligible and even negative in some cases, when segregation 
results in slight increases in import prices relative to no segregation. But thanks to the increase in 
production associated with GM crops, they can dramatically reduce their imports of agricultural 
commodities to feed their large populations. For such countries, the effect of trade restriction is limited to 
the changes in prices. They can be slightly better off overall under the most restrictive trade policies 
because the price of GM and especially non-GM products decreases under those scenarios compared with 
no trade restrictions. But these relative differences are minimal and most often negligible in comparison 
with the overall gains with the adoption of GM crops.  
Fifth, the results obtained in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, although not the focus of this 
paper, are quite interesting. The example of Tanzania and Uganda shows that the adoption of current GM 
crops would result in relatively higher gains than in any other countries. Our results also show that the 
rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is bound to gain significantly with the adoption of current GM crops elsewhere 
if there are trade restrictions in sensitive countries. This means that contrary to the general belief in many 
of these countries, trade restriction in sensitive countries can in fact be beneficial to them. Of course, 
these results are true only if these countries agree to import GM food products. Currently many of them 
do not regulate GM products, adopting an implicit position of don’t ask/don’t tell, while a few others do 
not allow imports of any GM product while waiting for their biosafety regulations to be implemented 
(Gruere 2006).  
In general, our results are comparable to previous work, except in the case of GM rice. We obtain 
larger gains for GM rice than previous studies, whether in China or globally. It is not always easy to 
compare results with those of other studies, because the studies do not necessarily use comparable 
models. For instance, Huang et al. (2004) focus only on China, without including adoption in other 
countries, but they also use a more detailed representation of the rice sector and of the economy. We do 
not explicitly reduce the gains from GM crops due to the price of seeds. Therefore the gains presented 
here include the returns to the developers and adopting producers together. In contrast, Huang et al. 
(2004) include higher seed costs in their analysis, which may contribute to their lower welfare gains.12 At 
                                                      
12 We did not have the relevant data to make assumptions about the costs of seed in the total production cost in all adopting 
countries, so instead we justify our restriction by shocking them with exogenous small adoption rates.  
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the same time, our simulations include the adoption of GM rice in a larger number of countries, therefore 
resulting in larger global welfare effects than other studies. Lastly, because we impose factor-biased 
productivity shocks that can result in large efficiency gains in certain critical sectors, our results may be 
different from what one would get by the imposition of a Hicks-neutral 5 percent shock in all producing 
nations.  
Table 17. Welfare gains in $ million per percentage point actual adoption of GM rice and wheat 
Crop Country 1 2a  2b  3a-i  3a-ii  3b-i  3b-ii 
Rice 
China  58.01 57.72 57.91 57.85 58.01 57.95 58.12 
  Bangladesh  9.19 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 
  India  45.42 45.18 45.34 45.34 45.31 45.39 45.38 
  Indonesia 17.31  17.24  17.29 17.3 17.31  17.31  17.32 
  Philippines 10.59 10.57 10.58 10.58 10.58 10.58 10.58 
Wheat 
China  13.76 13.68 13.76 13.73 13.97 13.76 14.01 
  Bangladesh  0.70 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.71 
  India 38.69  38.5  38.69  38.67  38.59  38.69  38.61 
  Argentina  4.31 4.25 4.3 4.28 4.12  4.31  4.14 
Source: Authors’ derivations. 
Despite the differences with previous studies, we believe that our results are plausible. Still, as in 
any simulation model, the results depend on the assumptions of the model and scenarios. One of the 
critical factors is the yield effect. To verify the validity of the results we ran two sets of additional 
simulations using the minimum and maximum values for yields in the four countries of study (tables 2 
through 5). We do not present all the results, but the case of selected scenarios under set B is presented in 
the appendix in Table A.5. As expected, the welfare effects are consistently lower for GM-adopting 
countries with the minimum yield effect than with the most likely yield effect. The shock with a 
maximum yield effect also results in slightly higher welfare gains for GM-adopting countries and overall, 
which means that the immiserizing growth effect is not visible for adopting nations. 
A second critical factor is the adoption rate. To provide a consistent idea of the welfare gains 
experienced by our countries of study in the case of GM rice and wheat, we divided the total annual gains 
by the adoption rates. The results are shown in millions of dollars per percentage of actual adoption in 
Table 17. In the case of rice, the gains range between $9 million and $60 million per percentage point 
depending on the country. India and China experience larger gains than the three other countries because 
the GM rice varieties they adopt provide larger relative gains in yields and because their rice sectors 
largely exceed the ones in other countries. Still, all these gains are significant. For instance, each 
percentage point of GM rice—as represented by the vector of traits defined in section 3—produced in  
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India will yield an estimated $45 million per year. This is quite remarkable. In the case of wheat, India 
derives a much higher gain from GM wheat ($38 million per percentage point) compared with other 
countries because of its higher productivity effect, and Bangladesh experiences only a really small gain 
compared with the other countries for the same reason and a much smaller wheat sector. These 
differences may also partially be the result of the repercussion of GM crop adoption on other factors and 




The introduction of transgenic crops is perceived as a relative success by some, as revealed by their 
reported adoption by millions of farmers in countries across the world, but it is perceived as a relative 
failure by others, in part because of its limitation to a few countries, crops, and traits, and because of 
consumer concerns in a number of countries. One of the reasons for the limitation of transgenic, or 
genetically modified, crops to certain traits and countries is related to market sensitivity, international 
trade risks, and the fear of export losses.  
In this paper we study the potential effects of introducing GM commodity crops in Bangladesh, 
India, Indonesia, and the Philippines—four Asian countries with large rural poor populations—in the 
presence of potential trade restrictions. We focus on GM field crops resistant to biotic and abiotic stresses 
that have not all been approved yet, such as drought-resistant rice, and use a multi-country, multi-sector 
computable general equilibrium model. We build on previous international simulation models by 
improving the representation of the productivity shocks with GM crops, taking into account regional or 
land type disparities, and by using an updated representation of the world market, accounting for the trade 
filter effects of labeling policies and the possibility of segregation for non-GM products going toward 
sensitive importing countries. Our scenarios of simulations also include current GM crop adopters and 
plausible leaders in the adoption of GM food crops.  
The results of our simulations first show that the gains associated with the adoption of GM crop 
combinations largely exceed any type of potential trade losses. In most countries and scenarios, the gains 
with GM technology, even at partial adoption rates, exceed the losses with trade by a factor of 14 or more. 
Second, we find that segregation can help reduce any potential trade loss for GM adopters that want to 
keep export opportunities in sensitive countries, but its advantage will depend on the segregation cost. 
Our results also show that the opportunity cost of segregation is much larger for sensitive importing 
countries than for exporting countries adopting new GM crops. This suggests that importers will likely 
have the incentive to invest in segregation chains for non-GM supplies to mitigate their expected losses 
due to the introduction of GM crops in exporting countries.  
Our results also show that GM rice is bound to be the most advantageous crop for the four 
countries of study. For instance, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the adoption of GM rice in 
India, combining different traits in different regions, could result in gains exceeding $45 million per year, 
with or without trade blocks in sensitive countries. Provided it is adopted, GM rice would also result in 
large production increases that would significantly decrease rice imports in countries with dense 
populations, such as Bangladesh or Indonesia. More generally, the relative gains with GM crop adoption 
are much larger for developing nations than for developed nations.   
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Therefore, our results demonstrate that, as in other countries, fears of trade losses related to the 
use of GM food crops in these Asian countries are plainly overstated in the current regulatory situation. It 
is certain that trade barriers could multiply with the adoption of similar trade-distorting regulations in a 
larger set of countries. A number of developing countries are intending to introduce stringent labeling 
requirements that could result in additional trade losses. Moreover, the Biosafety Protocol almost adopted 
generalized information requirements for GM commodities that would have incurred high costs on global 
commodity trade especially for developing countries that are members of the Protocol (Gruere and 
Rosegrant 2008). But the possible restrictions would likely result in economic losses for those particular 
countries, without being compensated by real consumer satisfaction, especially in the poorest and more 
populous countries of Asia. Still, in the current regulatory environment where enforced regulations are 
concentrated in a few importers, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines are bound to gain 
greatly from adopting GM commodity crops.  
At the end of this study, one question remains: What explains the discrepancy between our and 
others’ results showing the lack of real commercial risks and the fear of export losses in these various 
countries? Responding to this question would require delving into the political economy of biotechnology 
decision making in each of these countries, which is not the purpose of this study. Part of our team is 
conducting research on this particular issue, focusing on the role of various special interest groups, 
including traders, activists, and large importing companies in sensitive countries, in spreading the fear of 
commercial risks in different countries of Asia and Africa. As our results show, importers in sensitive 
countries would value segregation, but they would likely prefer to oppose the introduction of GM crops to 
avoid paying the cost of segregation. Our results further show that some importing nations of Sub-
Saharan Africa would gain from the adoption of current GM crops in other countries if there are trade 
restrictions in sensitive countries, as they would benefit from trade diversion and lower import prices. Yet 
many of them reject imports partially because they lack proper regulations but also because they fear they 
would affect their exports to sensitive countries. More needs to be done to investigate these contradictions 
and the role of different political actors in spreading exaggerated and perhaps irrational fears. 
Even if our simulations are based on improvements in assumptions and scenarios, they are still 
subject to a number of limitations. First, as with any ex ante simulation, the productivity effects are still 
largely uncertain and their level affects the results significantly. A sensitivity analysis on the yield factors 
for the countries of study showed that larger yield gains result in higher welfare gains ceteris paribus. 
More sensitivity analysis, particularly on the input factors in these and other countries, as well as on the 
segregation costs, would help provide a more complete picture of the range of possible effects of GM 
crops in the four countries of study.  
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Second, our simulation would gain by adopting a dynamic rather than a comparative static 
framework. Local expert meetings and elicitation provided some insight into the potential evolution of 
adoption in the countries of study. Accounting for the crop/trait-specific regulatory lag, extension lags, 
and adoption dynamics would help improve the plausibility of our results.  
Third, despite our effort to reduce obvious biases linked to the overaggregation of the GTAP 
database with the use of proportional factors, our model would be better served with structural 
differentiation within the relevant sectors. For instance, we use the share of maize in coarse grains in the 
reference database for calibration, but the model would perform more consistently with a structural model 
dividing the coarse grains sector into maize and other crops under all scenarios. Similar improvement 
could be made in the chemical sector, used as input, within the oilseed sector, or within each country at 
the regional level. Ultimately, a structural representation accounting for product and regional specificities 
could help derive disaggregated benefits per product and strata of the population in a particular region. 
More generally, it is necessary to keep in mind that the results of our global simulations, like the 
ones of other papers, do not account for the positive or negative effects of technology adoption on the 
environment and potential other externalities it may generate on other activities of the economy. On the 
one hand, the reduction of chemical inputs may provide benefits for farmers’ health and/or the 
environment; on the other hand, pest resistance building may affect other types of agriculture, and 
potential gene flows could affect natural biodiversity in specific cases. Our implicit assumption 
throughout the paper is that the GM crops we focus on are released after assessment and approval by the 
biosafety regulatory authorities in the relevant countries, on the conclusion that their potential risks are 
negligible or at least manageable under particular practices. Naturally, any possible external costs 
incurred by adopters would have to be compared with the large expected income gains we found in the 
four Asian countries we focused on.  
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES  
Table A.1. Percentage changes in production, export, and import volumes for selected set A scenarios in GM-adopting countries  
(numbers corresponding to GM-adopting region and sector are shown in bold) 







1 -3.3  -4.5  -6.0  9.0 5.5  -1.6  -0.7  -0.6 0.0  1.1  0.1 
2b -3.5  -4.5  -6.0  9.0 5.6  -1.7  -0.7  -0.5 0.0  1.1  0.2 
Coarse 
grains 
3b-ii -3.3 -4.5  -6.0  9.0 5.5  -1.6  -0.7  -0.6 0.0  1.1  0.1 
1  -3.3  -22.5  -28.3 20.8  4.8  -3.8  -3.7  -0.1 2.1  -3.4  33.0 
2b  -2.9  -22.5  -28.3 20.8  4.8  -3.7  -3.7  -0.1 2.1  -3.6  33.1 
Cotton 
3b-ii  -3.3  -22.5  -28.3 20.8  4.8  -3.8  -3.7  -0.1 2.1  -3.4  33.0 
1  -7.5 -9.9  -7.2  17.8  -11.4  0.3  -4.7  0.4 0.4  -6.6 -3.8 
2b  -6.3 -9.9  -7.3  18.6  -11.3  0.9  -5.4  0.4 0.4  -9.0 -2.9 
Production 
Oilseeds 
3b-ii  -8.0 -10.0  -7.3  18.0  -11.4  0.4  -4.8  0.3 0.4  -6.8 -3.8 
1 -4.8  -10.2  -6.1  -16.6 -10.6  -5.2  -5.2  -7.6 -5.0 -3.9  -12.4 
2b 0.1  -10.7  2.1  -17.5 -11.8  2.2  -8.7  -4.7 -0.8 -7.4  -14.0 
Coarse 
grains 
3b-ii -4.7  -10.1  -6.1  -16.1 -10.3  -5.1  -5.1  -7.5 -5.0 -3.8  -12.0 
1  -11.0  -23.8  -7.2 -9.9  -6.4  -9.5  -7.3  -12.9 -1.0 -11.4  -22.8 
2b  -13.0  -23.8  -10.7 -10.9 -6.9  -10.5 -7.0  -16.2 -5.1 -6.8  -23.1 
Cotton 
3b-ii  -10.2  -23.8  -4.5 -8.6  -6.3  -9.4  -7.3  -9.9 -0.3 -10.7  -22.6 
1  -10.7 -14.6  -6.4  -12.6 -9.2  -11.5 -7.3  -9.7 -12.2 -7.8 -11.1 
2b  -13.3 -16.2  -7.6  -15.7 -10.6  -17.1 -8.0  -18.8 -15.9 8.4 -14.5 
Exports 
Oilseeds 
3b-ii  -9.0 -14.1  -5.7  -4.9  -5.1  -7.6  -7.5  -3.2 -10.1 -6.9 -9.8 
1 -5.1  -15.7  -18.6  -14.7 -13.3  -5.2  -3.0  -0.9 -3.1 -9.2  -5.8 
2b -7.1  -15.6  -18.5  -14.8 -13.6  -4.9  13.4  -1.0 -3.1 -9.2  -6.0 
Coarse 
grains 
3b-ii -3.9  -15.8  -18.7  -14.7 -13.4  -5.3  -1.9  -0.9 -3.1 -9.2  -5.9 
1  -5.9  -30.4  -15.4 -27.3 -11.7  0.3  -2.0  -7.7 -11.1 -9.6  -6.4 
2b  -8.7  -30.4  -15.4 -27.5 -11.7  0.0  -1.9  -7.7 -11.1 -9.5  -6.5 
Cotton 
3b-ii  -4.1  -30.7  -15.8 -27.4 -11.7  0.2  -1.7  -7.8 -11.2 -9.8  -6.4 
1  -10.9 -17.2  -23.7  -21.4 7.3  -4.1  -8.2  -10.5 -1.3 -18.7 0.2 
2b  -12.5 -17.2  -23.8  -22.2 6.3  -5.6  -10.5  -10.5 -3.0 -18.9 -2.6 
Imports 
Oilseeds 
3b-ii  -11.3 -19.3  -25.2  -21.8 6.9  -4.1  -1.3  -11.6 -1.6 -19.8 0.0  
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Table A.2. Percentage changes in production, export, and import volumes for selected set B scenarios in GM-adopting countries  
(numbers corresponding to GM-adopting region and sector are shown in bold) 







1 -3.3  -4.5  -6.0  9.0 5.5  -1.6  -0.7  -0.6 0.0  1.1  0.1 
2b -3.5  -4.5  -6.0  9.0 5.6  -1.7  -0.7  -0.5 0.0  1.1  0.2 
Coarse 
grains 
3b-ii -3.3 -4.5  -6.0  9.0 5.5  -1.6  -0.7  -0.6 0.0  1.1  0.1 
1  -3.3  -22.5  -28.3 20.8  4.8  -3.8  -3.7  -0.1 2.1  -3.4  33.0 
2b  -2.9  -22.5  -28.3 20.8  4.8  -3.7  -3.7  -0.1 2.1  -3.6  33.1 
Cotton 
3b-ii  -3.3  -22.5  -28.3 20.8  4.8  -3.8  -3.7  -0.1 2.1  -3.4  33.0 
1  -7.5 -9.9  -7.2  17.8  -11.4  0.3  -4.7  0.4 0.4  -6.6 -3.8 
2b  -6.3 -9.9  -7.3  18.6  -11.3  0.9  -5.4  0.4 0.4  -9.0 -2.9 
Production 
Oilseeds 
3b-ii  -8.0 -10.0  -7.3  18.0  -11.4  0.4  -4.8  0.3 0.4  -6.8 -3.8 
1 -4.8  -10.2  -6.1  -16.6 -10.6  -5.2  -5.2  -7.6 -5.0 -3.9  -12.4 
2b 0.1  -10.7  2.1  -17.5 -11.8  2.2  -8.7  -4.7 -0.8 -7.4  -14.0 
Coarse 
grains 
3b-ii -4.7  -10.1  -6.1  -16.1 -10.3  -5.1  -5.1  -7.5 -5.0 -3.8  -12.0 
1  -11.0  -23.8  -7.2 -9.9  -6.4  -9.5  -7.3  -12.9 -1.0 -11.4  -22.8 
2b  -13.0  -23.8  -10.7 -10.9 -6.9  -10.5 -7.0  -16.2 -5.1 -6.8  -23.1 
Cotton 
3b-ii  -10.2  -23.8  -4.5 -8.6  -6.3  -9.4  -7.3  -9.9 -0.3 -10.7  -22.6 
1  -10.7 -14.6  -6.4  -12.6 -9.2  -11.5 -7.3  -9.7 -12.2 -7.8 -11.1 
2b  -13.3 -16.2  -7.6  -15.7 -10.6  -17.1 -8.0  -18.8 -15.9 8.4 -14.5 
Exports 
Oilseeds 
3b-ii  -9.0 -14.1  -5.7  -4.9  -5.1  -7.6  -7.5  -3.2 -10.1 -6.9 -9.8 
1 -5.1  -15.7  -18.6  -14.7 -13.3  -5.2  -3.0  -0.9 -3.1 -9.2  -5.8 
2b -7.1  -15.6  -18.5  -14.8 -13.6  -4.9  13.4  -1.0 -3.1 -9.2  -6.0 
Coarse 
grains 
3b-ii -3.9  -15.8  -18.7  -14.7 -13.4  -5.3  -1.9  -0.9 -3.1 -9.2  -5.9 
1  -5.9  -30.4  -15.4 -27.3 -11.7  0.3  -2.0  -7.7 -11.1 -9.6  -6.4 
2b  -8.7  -30.4  -15.4 -27.5 -11.7  0.0  -1.9  -7.7 -11.1 -9.5  -6.5 
Cotton 
3b-ii  -4.1  -30.7  -15.8 -27.4 -11.7  0.2  -1.7  -7.8 -11.2 -9.8  -6.4 
1  -10.9 -17.2  -23.7  -21.4 7.3  -4.1  -8.2  -10.5 -1.3 -18.7 0.2 
2b  -12.5 -17.2  -23.8  -22.2 6.3  -5.6  -10.5  -10.5 -3.0 -18.9 -2.6 
Imports 
Oilseeds 
3b-ii  -11.3 -19.3  -25.2  -21.8 6.9  -4.1  -1.3  -11.6 -1.6 -19.8 0.0 
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Table A.3. Percentage changes in production, export, and import volumes for selected set RICE 
scenarios in GM-adopting countries 
Set RICE  Scenario  China  Bangladesh India  Indonesia  Philippines 
1  19.7 7.5 19.8 20.4 19.1 
2a  19.5 7.5 19.7 20.2 18.9 
2b  17.9 7.5 16.4 19.3 17.8 
Production 
3b-ii  19.5 7.5 19.6 20.2 18.9 
1  18.3 9.8 15.3 150.7 84.5 
2a  5.6 -5.1 7.9 100.5 46.4 
2b  -18.0 -31.4 -6.0 8.0 -24.1 
Exports 
 
3b-ii  15.6 3.0 13.5 130.4 67.6 
1  -45.9 -27.0 -49.4 -65.2 -56.2 
2a  -46.1 -27.1 -49.7 -65.4 -56.4 
2b  -46.7 -27.4 -50.4 -65.8 -57.0 
Imports 
3b-ii  -46.1 -27.1 -49.6 -65.3 -56.3 
Source: Authors’ derivations. 
Table A.4. Percentage changes in production, export, and import volumes for selected set WHEAT 
scenarios in GM-adopting countries 
Set WHEAT  Scenario  China  Bangladesh India  Argentina
1  9.1 -4.3 16.8 30.8
2a  9.1 -4.3 16.8 30.8
2b  8.3 -4.4 14.5 30.3
Production 
3b-ii  9.0 -4.3 16.2 30.7
1  44.7 -36.8 50.5 -5.8
2a  44.1 -36.8 50.3 -5.8
2b  -63.8 -37.2 35.2 -6.1
Exports 
 
3b-ii  10.7 -36.9 45.6 -5.9
1  -43.6 -0.6 -42.7 -36.9
2a  -43.6 -0.6 -42.7 -36.9
2b  -44.1 -0.6 -43.3 -37.1
Imports 
3b-ii  -43.7 -0.6 -42.9 -37.0
Source: Authors’ derivations. 
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3b-ii. Import filter, 
5% cost segregation
Minimum 
3b-ii. Import filter, 
5% cost segregation
Most likely 
3b-ii. Import filter, 
5% cost segregation
Maximum 
Region   $ million  % $ million  % $ million  %  $ million  % $ million  % $ million %
Australia and New Zealand  -52.555 -0.016 -53.062 -0.016 -53.140 -0.016  -48.641 -0.015 -49.154 -0.015 -49.234 -0.015
China  243.542 0.031 242.399 0.031 243.025 0.031  248.426 0.032 247.285 0.032 247.918 0.032
Japan 431.796 0.014 435.365 0.014 437.256 0.014  258.273 0.008 261.864 0.009 263.763 0.009
South Korea  359.921 0.124 360.583 0.125 360.992 0.125  56.743 0.020 57.709 0.020 58.197 0.020
Rest of Asia  142.500 0.025 143.124 0.025 144.049 0.025  145.834 0.026 146.457 0.026 147.382 0.026
Indonesia  52.700 0.053 113.213 0.115 150.886 0.153  53.122 0.054 113.639 0.115 151.315 0.153
Philippines  122.944 0.196 120.197 0.191 120.345 0.192  122.664 0.195 119.918 0.191 120.065 0.191
Bangladesh  0.241 0.001 1.008 0.003 1.336 0.004  0.237 0.001 1.004 0.003 1.332 0.004
India  625.615 0.168 825.588 0.221 862.765 0.231  624.066 0.167 824.106 0.221 861.303 0.231
Canada  38.916 0.007 39.428 0.007 39.491 0.007  41.228 0.008 41.738 0.008 41.800 0.008
United States  1842.366 0.022 1848.543 0.022 1848.750 0.022  1854.163 0.022 1860.343 0.022 1860.551 0.022
Mexico  333.425 0.070 333.683 0.070 333.839 0.070  334.381 0.070 334.641 0.070 334.799 0.070
Rest of Latin America  103.728 0.020 103.975 0.021 103.965 0.021  108.362 0.021 108.608 0.021 108.599 0.021
Argentina  -281.731 -0.124 -282.945 -0.125 -283.500 -0.125  -283.338 -0.125 -284.556 -0.125 -285.137 -0.126
Brazil  28.042 0.007 27.534 0.007 27.431 0.007  15.304 0.004 14.790 0.004 14.687 0.004
European Union  495.925 0.008 506.163 0.008 508.240 0.008  275.696 0.004 286.030 0.004 288.130 0.004
Rest of Europe  42.469 0.006 43.566 0.006 43.941 0.006  25.626 0.004 26.728 0.004 27.083 0.004
North Africa and Middle East  253.074 0.031 256.574 0.032 257.765 0.032  252.918 0.031 256.414 0.032 257.606 0.032
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -2.893 -0.002 -2.877 -0.002 -2.815 -0.002 -0.429 0.000 -0.420 0.000 -0.359 0.000
South Africa  20.122 0.023 20.568 0.024 20.618 0.024  19.808 0.023 20.254 0.023 20.304 0.023
Tanzania and Uganda  44.557 0.321 44.558 0.322 44.565 0.322  44.522 0.321 44.523 0.321 44.529 0.321
World 4844.700 0.020 5127.184 0.021 5209.803 0.021  4148.963 0.017 4431.919 0.018 4514.632 0.018
Source: Authors’ derivations.  
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Table A.6. Opportunity cost ($ million/yr) of segregation of non-GM crops for exports toward final 
consumption under set A and set B for adopting and sensitive countries 
Country  Set A   Set B 
GM producers only 
China  -1.34 -1.37 
Indonesia  -1.93 -0.93 
Philippines   0.18 0.17 
Bangladesh  -0.03 -0.06 
India  4.8 4.69 
Canada  3.06 3.04 
USA  5.17 5.21 
Mexico  -2.82 -2.84 
Argentina  6.80 6.80 
Brazil  19.23 19.15 
South Africa  0.58 0.58 
Tanzania/Uganda  -0.26 0.30 
Total GM producers  33.44 34.74 
Sensitive countries 
Australia/NZ  3.44 3.46 
Japan  150.82 149.3 
South Korea  722.12 724.21 
EU  536.77 541.28 
Rest of Europe  46.22 46.44 
Total sensitive countries  1459.37  1464.69 
WORLD     
Global  1434.36 1439.62 
Source: Authors’ derivations.  
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